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vAbstract
This thesis is a collection of essays on the incentive, fairness, and solidarity
properties of recommendations to different economic problems such as queue-
ing, matching, and cost allocation.
In Chapter 1, we consider queueing problems. We prove that no rule is
Pareto-efficient and coalitional strategy-proof. We identify the class of rules
that satisfy Pareto-efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness.
Among multi-valued rules, there is a unique rule that satisfies Pareto-efficiency,
anonymity, and strategy-proofness.
In Chapter 2, we consider two-sided matching markets with contracts. We
prove that the stable correspondence is the only solution that satisfies una-
nimity, population monotonicity, and Maskin-monotonicity. If a rule satisfies
unanimity, both forms of population monotonicity and a weak notion of con-
sistency, then it is a subsolution of the stable correspondence. We also ana-
lyze immunity of solutions to strategic behavior such as to misreporting the
availability of contracts held by the firms, and misrepresenting preferences by
workers and firms. We introduce destruction-proofness, and study destruction-
proofness and strategy-proofness. We show that if the firms’ preferences satisfy
the substitute condition, then the worker-optimal solution is not destruction-
proof and the firm-optimal solution is destruction-proof. If the firms’ prefer-
vi
ences satisfy the substitute condition, the law of aggregate demand, and the
top-dominance condition then the worker-optimal solution is the only solution
satisfying stability and strategy-proofness.
In Chapter 3, we consider a class of cost sharing problems with the follow-
ing features: agents are ordered in terms of their needs for a public facility;
satisfying an agent implies satisfying all agents with smaller needs than his at
no extra cost. The “sequential equal contributions” rule assigns each agent
using a given segment to contribute equally to the cost of the segment and
to pay the total of the contributions of each segment that the agent uses.
We show that the sequential equal contributions rule is the only rule satisfy-
ing equal treatment of equals, independence of predecessors, and smallest-cost
consistency and it is the only rule satisfying individual rationality, cost mono-
tonicity, and smallest-cost consistency.
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1Foreword
This thesis is a collection of joint and solo essays on the incentive, fairness, and
solidarity properties of recommendations to different economic problems such
as queueing, matching, and cost allocation. Some results are from joint works
with Youngsub Chun, Eve Ramaekers, Chun-Hsien Yeh, and Duygu Yengin.
Chapter 1
Queueing
1.1 Introduction
A set of agents simultaneously arrive at a service facility that can only serve
one agent at a time. Agents require service for the same length of time. The
waiting cost may vary from one agent to the other. Each agent is assigned a
“consumption bundle” consisting of a position in the queue and a positive or
negative transfer. Each agent has quasi-linear preferences over positions and
transfers. For such a queueing problem, a rule assigns each agent a position
in the queue and a positive or negative transfer such that no two agents are
assigned the same position, and the sum of transfers is not positive.
Our objective is to identify rules that are well-behaved from the normative
and strategic viewpoints. In addition to efficiency, we assess the desirability of
2
3a rule from two perspectives: the fairness of the allocations it selects and the
incentive it gives to agents to tell the truth about their cost parameters. The
first requirement is efficiency. It says that if an allocation is selected, there
should be no other feasible allocation that each agent finds at least as desirable
and at least one agent prefers. Since preferences are quasi-linear, Pareto-
efficiency can be decomposed into two axioms: on the one hand, efficiency of
queues, which says that a queue should minimize the total waiting cost, and
on the other hand, balancedness, which says that transfers should sum up to
zero.
Second is a minimal symmetry requirement: agents with equal waiting costs
should be treated equally. As agents cannot be served simultaneously, it is of
course impossible for two agents with equal costs to have equal assignments.
However, using monetary transfers, we can give them assignments between
which they are indifferent. We require equal treatment of equals in welfare:
agents with equal waiting costs should be indifferent their assignments. It is
implied by no-envy, which requires that no agent should prefer another agent’s
assignment to her own.
Third is immunity to strategic behavior. As unit waiting costs may not
be known, the rule should provide agents incentive to reveal these costs truth-
fully. Strategy-proofness requires that each agent should find her assignment
when she truthfully reveals her unit waiting cost at least as desirable as her
4assignment when she misrepresents it. We are also concerned about possible
manipulations by groups, and consider coalitional strategy-proofness : no group
of agents should be able to make each of its members at least as well off, and
at least one of them better off, by jointly misrepresenting their waiting costs.
Finally is non-bossiness : if an agent’s change in her announcement does not
affect her assignment, then it should not affect any other agent’s assignment.
We identify the class of rules that satisfy efficiency of queues and strategy-
proofness. We show that a unique allocation rule satisfies Pareto-efficiency,
equal treatment of equals in welfare, and strategy-proofness. For each problem,
this rule selects a Pareto-efficient queue and it sets transfers as follows: con-
sider each pair of agents in turn, make each agent in the pair pay the waiting
cost incurred by the other agent in the pair, and distributes the sum of these
two payments equally among the others. We refer to this rule as the Equally
Distributed Pairwise Pivotal rule. As the name indicates, it applies the idea of
the well-known Pivotal rule from the class of Groves’ rules in public decision-
making problems in each pair (Clarke 1971, Groves, 1973). The Equally Dis-
tributed Pairwise Pivotal rule also satisfies no-envy. Using this result, we also
show that in combination with Pareto-efficiency and strategy-proofness, equal
treatment of equals in welfare is equivalent to no-envy.
We may also be concerned about possible manipulations by groups. How-
ever, if we impose the stronger incentive property of coalitional strategy-proofness,
5even with efficiency of queues, we have an impossibility result. This result sug-
gests that the previous result is tight.
We then extend the first result to possibly multi-valued rules. First, we con-
sider fairness properties when it is possible to give two agents with equal unit
waiting costs same assignments at two different allocations. Then, symmetry
requires that agents with equal waiting costs should be treated symmetrically,
that is, if there is another allocation at which two agents exchange their as-
signments and the other agents keep theirs, then this allocation should be
selected. It is implied by anonymity, which requires that agents’ names should
not matter. However, whereas single- and multi-valued rules may satisfy equal
treatment of equals in welfare, only multi-valued rules may satisfy symmetry.
Thus, because agents cannot be served simultaneously, anonymity is possible
if and only if multi-valuedness is allowed. Second, strategy-proofness has to be
redefined for multi-valued rules. To compare the welfare levels derived from
two sets of feasible allocations, we assume that an agent prefers the former to
the latter if and only if for each allocation in the latter, there is an allocation
in the former that she finds at least as desirable; and for each allocation in the
former, there is an allocation in the latter that she does not prefer.
Next, we define the rule that selects all Pareto-efficient queues and for
each queue, sets transfers as in the Equally Distributed Pairwise Pivotal rule.
We refer to it as the Largest Equally Distributed Pairwise Pivotal rule. We
6prove that a unique allocation rule satisfies Pareto-efficiency, symmetry, and
strategy-proofness. Moreover, it is anonymous. Also, as anonymity implies
symmetry, and as the Largest Equally Distributed Pairwise Pivotal rule is the
union of all the rules that satisfy Pareto-efficiency, equal treatment of equals
in welfare, and strategy-proofness, it follows that this rule is the only rule that
satisfies Pareto-efficiency, equal treatment of equals in welfare, symmetry, and
strategy-proofness.
The intuition for the results is simple. Any rule can be described by se-
lecting the queues appropriately and setting each agent’s transfer equal to
the cost she imposes on the others plus an appropriately chosen amount. By
Pareto-efficiency, a desirable rule should select Pareto-efficient queues and as
the costs agents impose on the others are always strictly positive (except for
the last agent in the queue), it should redistribute the sum of these costs. By
equity, it should select all Pareto-efficient queues and it should redistribute
this sum fairly. By strategy-proofness, it should redistribute this sum in such
a way that each agent’s share only depends on the others’ waiting costs. This
is exactly what the Largest Equally Distributed Pairwise Pivotal rule does.
It selects all Pareto-efficient queues (so it is efficient and fair). It sets each
agent’s transfer considering each pair of agents in turn, making each agent in
the pair pay the cost she imposes on the pair. Then, it distributes the sum of
these two payments (so it is efficient) equally (so it is fair) among the others
7(so it is strategy-proof ).
Literature Review: Our results provide another example of a situation in
which Pareto-efficiency, equity axioms such as equal treatment of equals in wel-
fare and symmetry, and strategy-proofness are compatible. For general social
choice problems, each equity axiom is incompatible with strategy-proofness
(Gibbard, 1973 and Satterthwaite, 1975). For the classical problem of dis-
tributing of private goods (and even if preferences are homothetic and smooth),
Pareto-efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness are incom-
patible (Serizawa, 2002). In economies with indivisible goods when monetary
compensations are possible, no-envy and strategy-proofness are incompatible
(Alkan, Demange, and Gale, 1991, Tadenuma and Thomson, 1995); more-
over, when rules exist that satisfy these axioms on more restricted classes of
problems, they violate Pareto-efficiency.
There are some exceptions. For the problem of choosing a public good
in an interval over which the agents have continuous and single-peaked pref-
erences, Pareto-efficiency, anonymity, and strategy-proofness are compatible
(Moulin, 1980). For the problem of distributing an infinitely divisible private
good over which the agents have continuous and single-peaked preferences,
Pareto-efficiency, equal treatment of equals in welfare, and strategy-proofness
are compatible, and so are Pareto-efficiency, anonymity, and strategy-proofness
(Sprumont, 1991, Ching, 1994). For the problem of distributing infinitely divis-
8ible private goods produced by means of a linear technology, Pareto-efficiency,
equal treatment of equals in welfare, and strategy-proofness are compatible
(Maniquet and Sprumont, 1999).1
The literature on queueing can be organized in two groups of papers. The
first group concerns the identification of rules satisfying equity axioms pertain-
ing to changes in the set of agents or in their waiting costs, in addition to the
efficiency and equity axioms that we impose too (Maniquet, 2003; Chun, 2004a;
Chun, 2004b; Katta and Sethuraman, 2005). Only rules that select Pareto-
efficient queues and set each agent’s transfer in such a way that her welfare is
equal to the Shapley value of some associated coalitional game, satisfy these ax-
ioms (Maniquet, 2003, Chun, 2004a; Katta and Sethuraman, 2005). However,
while there are rules that satisfy Pareto-efficiency and no-envy (Chun, 2004b;
Katta and Sethuraman, 2005), none satisfies the solidarity requirement that if
the waiting costs change, then all agents should gain together or lose together
(Chun, 2004b). The second group concerns the identification of necessary
and sufficient conditions for the existence of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency
and strategy-proofness. For such problems, like for any public decision-making
problem in which agents have additively separable preferences, there are rules
that satisfy efficiency of queues and strategy-proofness (Groves, 1973). Also,
like for any public decision-making problem in which preference profiles are
1For an extensive survey on strategy-proofness, see Thomson (2006).
9convex, only these rules satisfy these properties (Holmstro¨m, 1979).2 However,
these rules are not balanced (Green and Laffont, 1977). Unless we further re-
strict the domain, Pareto-efficiency and strategy-proofness are incompatible.
In queueing problems, if preferences are quasi-linear over positions and trans-
fers, there are rules that satisfy Pareto-efficiency and strategy-proofness (Suijs,
1996, Mitra and Sen, 1998).
In Section 1.2, we formally introduce the model. In Section 1.3, we define
the axioms on rules. In Section 1.4, we give the results. In Section 1.5, we give
concluding comments. In Appendix A, we provide all proofs.
1.2 Model
There is a finite set of agents N indexed by i ∈ N . Each agent i ∈ N has to be
assigned a position σi ∈ N in a queue and may receive a positive or negative
monetary transfer ti ∈ R. Preferences are quasi-linear over X ≡ N × R. Let
ci ∈ R+ be the unit waiting cost of i ∈ N . If i is served σi-th, her total
waiting cost is (σi − 1)ci. Her preferences can be represented by the function
ui defined as follows: for each (σi, ti) ∈ X, ui(σi, ti) = −(σi− 1)ci+ ti. We use
the following notational shortcut. If her waiting cost is c′i, then her preferences
2In fact, Holmstro¨m (1979) shows it that any public decision-making problem in which
preference profiles are smoothly connected, i.e., for any profile in the domain, if there is
a differentiable deformation of the profile into other then the other profile is also in the
domain; only Groves’ rules satisfy efficiency of assignment and strategy-proofness. This
characterization also holds on the universal domain of preferences (Green and Laffont, 1977).
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are represented by the function u′i, defined by u
′
i(σi, ti) = −(σi− 1)c′i+ ti; if it
is c˜i, then we use u˜i(σi, ti) = −(σi − 1)c˜i + ti, and so on. A queueing problem
is defined as a list c ≡ (ci)i∈N ∈ RN+ . Let C ≡ RN+ be the set of all problems.
Let n = |N |.
An allocation for c ∈ C is a pair (σ, t) ≡ (σi, ti)i∈N ∈ XN . An allocation
(σ, t) ∈ XN is feasible for c ∈ C if no two agents are assigned the same position
in σ, (i.e., for each {i, j} ⊆ N with i 6= j, we have σi 6= σj), and the sum of
the coordinates of t is non-positive, (i.e.,
∑
i∈N ti ≤ 0). Let Z(N) be the set
of all feasible allocations for c ∈ C. An (allocation) rule ϕ is a correspondence
that associates with each problem c ∈ C a non-empty set of feasible allocations
ϕ(c) ⊆ Z(N).
Given c ∈ C and S ⊆ N , cS ≡ (cl)l∈S is the restriction of c to S. Given
i ∈ N , c−i ≡ (cl)l∈N\{i} is the restriction of c to N\{i}. Let (σ, t) ∈ Z(N).
Given i ∈ N , let Pi(σ) ≡ {j ∈ N |σj < σi} be the set of agents served before
i in σ, (the predecessors), and Fi(σ) ≡ {j ∈ N |σj > σi} the set of agents
served after i in σ, (the followers). Given {i, j} ⊆ N , let Bij(σ) ≡ {l ∈
N |min{σi, σj} < σl < max{σi, σj}} be the set of agents served between i and
j in σ.3 Given S ⊆ N , the total waiting cost of S is ∑i∈S(σi − 1)ci. Given
i ∈ N , let σ−i be such that for each l ∈ Pi(σ), we have σ−il = σl and for each
l ∈ Fi(σ), we have σ−il = σl − 1. Given i ∈ N , and S ⊆ N , the cost that agent
3For each c ∈ C, each (σ, t) ∈ Z(N), and each {i, j} ⊆ N , we have Bij(σ) = Bji(σ).
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i imposes on S is
∑
l∈S∩Fi(σ) cl. Thus, the cost an agent imposes on society is
always equal to the sum of the unit waiting costs of her followers in an efficient
queue.
1.3 Properties of rules
In this section, we define properties of rules. Let ϕ be a rule. First, if an
allocation is selected, there should be no other feasible allocation that each
agent finds at least as desirable and at least one agent prefers.
Pareto-efficiency: For each c ∈ C and each (σ, t) ∈ ϕ(c), if there is no
(σ′, t′) ∈ Z(N) such that for each i ∈ N , ui(σ′i, t′i) ≥ ui(σi, ti) and for at least
one j ∈ N , we have uj(σ′j, t′j) > uj(σj, tj).
Consider a Pareto-efficient allocation for c, any other allocation at which
the queue is the same is also Pareto-efficient. Therefore, it is meaningful to
define efficiency of queues. It requires to minimize the total waiting cost. Thus,
an allocation (σ, t) is Pareto-efficient for c if and only if for each σ′ ∈ NN , we
have
∑
i∈N(σ
′
i−1)ci ≥
∑
i∈N(σi−1)ci, i.e., σ is efficient for c and
∑
i∈N ti = 0,
i.e., t is balanced for c. Let Q∗(c) be the set of all efficient queues for c. For
each c ∈ C and each (σ, t) ∈ Z(N), we have σ ∈ Q∗(c) if and only if for each
{i, j} ⊂ N with i 6= j, if σi < σj, then ci ≥ cj. Thus, up to permutation of
agents with equal unit waiting costs, there is only one efficient queue.
12
Summarizing the discussion above, Pareto-efficiency can be decomposed
into two axioms:
Efficiency of queues: For each c ∈ C and each (σ, t) ∈ ϕ(c), we have σ ∈
Q∗(c).
Balancedness: For each c ∈ C and each (σ, t) ∈ ϕ(c), we have ∑i∈N ti = 0.
Equity requires to treat agents with equal unit waiting costs equally. We
require that equal agents should have equal welfare.
Equal treatment of equals in welfare: For each c ∈ C, each (σ, t) ∈ ϕ(c),
and each {i, j} ⊂ N with i 6= j and ci = cj, we have ui(σi, ti) = uj(σj, tj).
This requirement is necessary for no agent to prefer another agent’s assignment
to her own.
No-envy: For each c ∈ C, each (σ, t) ∈ ϕ(c), and each i ∈ N , there is no
j ∈ N\{i} such that ui(σj, tj) > ui(σi, ti).
The last requirements are motivated by strategic considerations. The plan-
ner may not know the agents’ cost parameters. If agents behave strategically
when announcing them, neither efficiency nor equity may be attained. Thus,
we require that each agent should find her assignment when she truthfully
reveals her unit waiting cost at least as desirable as her assignment when she
misrepresents it.
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Strategy-proofness: For each c ∈ C, each i ∈ N , and each c′i ∈ R+, if
(σ, t) = ϕ(c) and (σ′, t′) = ϕ(c′i, c−i), then ui(σi, ti) ≥ ui(σ′i, t′i).
We also consider the requirement that no group of agents should be able to
make each of its members at least as well off, and at least one of them better
off, by jointly misrepresenting its members waiting costs.
Coalitional strategy-proofness: For each c ∈ C and each S ⊆ N , there is
no c′S ∈ RS+ such that if (σ, t) = ϕ(c) and (σ′, t′) = ϕ(c′S, cN\S), then for each
i ∈ S, we have ui(σ′i, t′i) ≥ ui(σi, ti) and for some j ∈ S, we have uj(σ′j, t′j) >
uj(σj, tj).
The next requirement is that if an agent’s change in her announcement does not
affect her assignment, then it should not affect any other agent’s assignment.
Non-bossiness: For each c ∈ C, each i ∈ N , and each c′i ∈ R+, if ϕi(c) =
ϕi(c
′
i, c−i), then ϕ(c) = ϕ(c
′
i, c−i).
1.4 Results
In this section, we first characterize the class of single-valued rules that satisfy
Pareto-efficiency, equal treatment of equals in welfare, and strategy-proofness.
We then show that these rules in fact satisfy the stronger fairness property of
no-envy (Theorem 1.2). Then, we extend these results to multi-valued rules
14
and we prove that there is a unique rule that satisfies Pareto-efficiency, symme-
try, and strategy-proofness. Also, this rule satisfies anonymity (Theorem 1.4).4
1.4.1 Single-valued rules
We first prove that a single-valued rule satisfies efficiency of queues and strategy-
proofness if and only if for each problem, it selects an efficient queue (of course)
and sets each agent’s transfer as prescribed in Groves (1973), i.e., equal to the
total waiting cost of all other agents plus an amount only depending on these
agents’ unit waiting costs (Theorem 1.1). As the domain of preference profiles
is convex, it is smoothly connected. Thus, this result follows from Holmstro¨m’s
(1979). However, we are able to give a simpler proof by exploiting the special
features of our model. Formally, let D ≡ {d| for each c ∈ C, we have d(c) ∈
Q∗(c)}. Let H ≡ {(hi)i∈N | for each i ∈ N , we have hi : RN\{i}+ → R}. A
single-valued rule ϕ is a Groves’ rule if and only if there are d ∈ D and h ∈ H
such that for each c ∈ C, ϕ(c) = (σ, t) ∈ Z(N) with σ = d(c), and for each
i ∈ N , ti = −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − 1)cl + hi(c−i).
Theorem 1.1. A single-valued rule is a Groves rule if and only if it satisfies
efficiency of queues and strategy-proofness.
The class of Groves’ rules is large. We distinguish subclasses according to their
4By extending Theorem 1.2 to multi-valued rules, we prove that what holds in the special
case of single-valued rules still holds in the general case of single- and multi-valued rules.
Thus, single-valuedness and Theorem 1.4 imply Theorem 1.2.
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h function. For instance, the Pivotal rules are the Groves’ rules associated with
h ∈ H such that for each c ∈ C, for each i ∈ N , hi(c−i) =
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l −1)cl.5
By Theorem 1.1, a single-valued rule satisfies Pareto-efficiency and strategy-
proofness if and only if it is a Groves rule and it is balanced. However, for
two-agent problems, no Groves rule is balanced (Suijs, 1996). From now on,
we focus on problems with more than two agents.
We now introduce another class of single-valued rules. A rule in this class
selects for each problem a Pareto-efficient queue and sets transfers considering
each pair of agents in turn, making each agent in the pair pay what a Pivotal
rule recommends for the subproblem consisting of these two agents, and dis-
tributing the sum of these two payments equally among the others. Thus, for
each problem and each selected queue, each agent’s transfer is such that she
pays the cost she imposes on the other agent and she receives 1
n−2 -th of the
cost each agent imposes on the other agent in the pair that she is not part of.
Equally Distributed Pairwise Pivotal rule, ϕ∗: For each c ∈ C, if (σ, t) =
ϕ∗(c), then σ ∈ Q∗(c) and for each i ∈ N , we have
ti = −
∑
j∈N\{i}
∑
l∈{i,j}∩Fi(σ) cl +
1
(n−2)
∑
j∈N\{i}
∑
k∈N\{i,j}
∑
l∈{j,k}∩Fj(σ) cl.
An example of a problem illustrating the rule:
Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and c ∈ RN+ such that c1 > c2 > c3 > c4. The efficiency
5Pivotal rules are also known as Clarke’s rules (Clarke, 1971).
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of queues implies that agents should be served in decreasing order of their
waiting costs. Thus, the efficient queue is σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4) = (1, 2, 3, 4).
Then, consider each pair of agents, and make each agent in the pair pay the
cost that the agent imposes on the other agent. Then, distribute the sum of
these two payments equally among the others. The following table shows how
payments are calculated. For example, for the pair {2, 4}, by Pareto-efficiency
agent 2 should be served before agent 4. The cost agent 2 imposes on agent
4 is c4 but agent 4 does not impose any cost on agent 2. So, agent 2 pays c4
and agent 4 pays nothing. The amount collected in total is distributed among
agents 1 and 3 equally: each of them receives c4/2.
1 2 3 4
12 −c2 0 c2/2 c2/2
13 −c3 c3/2 0 c3/2
14 −c4 c4/2 c4/2 0
23 c3/2 −c3 0 c3/2
24 c4/2 −c4 c4/2 0
34 c4/2 c4/2 −c4 0
The final monetary consumption is the sum of all the transfers for each possible
pair. Then, t = (t1, t2, t3, t4) = (−c2 − c3/2,−c3/2, c2/2, c2/2 + c3). The
allocation selected by the Equally Distributed Pairwise Pivotal rule is Pareto-
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efficient. The rule satisfies equal treatment of equals, no-envy, and strategy-
proofness. However, the rule is not coalitionally strategy-proof because agent
2 and agent 3 have incentive to misrepresent their waiting costs jointly.
As there may be several Pareto-efficient queues for a problem, there are several
Equally Distributed Pairwise Pivotal rules. Proposition 1.1 states that for each
problem and each Pareto-efficient queue, the transfers set by any Equally
Distributed Pairwise Pivotal rule can be obtained in three other ways. First,
making each agent pay what the Pivotal rule recommends for the problem,
giving each agent 1
n−2 -th of what the others pay. Second, giving each agent
1
n−2 -th of her predecessors’ total waiting cost and making each agent pay
1
n−2 -
th of her followers’ gain from not being last (Mitra and Sen, 1998, Mitra,
2001). Third, giving each agent one half of her predecessors’ unit waiting cost
and making each agent pay one half of her followers’ unit waiting cost plus
1
2(n−2) -th of the difference between two unit waiting costs of any other agent
and this agent’s predecessors’s (Suijs, 1996).
Proposition 1.1. Let ϕ be a single-valued rule. Then, the following state-
ments are equivalent.
1. ϕ is an Equally Distributed Pairwise Pivotal rule.
2. ϕ is a Groves rule associated with h ∈ H such that for each c ∈ C,
if (σ, t) = ϕ(c), then for each i ∈ N , hi(c−i) =
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l − 1)cl +
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1
(n−2)
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l − 1)cl.
3. ϕ is such that for each c ∈ C, if (σ, t) = ϕ(c), then σ ∈ Q∗(c) and for
each i ∈ N , ti =
∑
l∈Pi(σ)
(σl−1)
(n−2) cl −
∑
l∈Fi(σ)
(n−σl)
(n−2) cl.
4. ϕ is such that for each c ∈ C, if (σ, t) = ϕ(c), then σ ∈ Q∗(c) and for
each i ∈ N , ti =
∑
l∈Pi(σ)
cl
2
−∑l∈Fi(σ) cl2 −∑l∈N\{i}∑k∈Pl(σ)\{i} ck−cl2(n−2) .
Next, we prove that requiring Pareto-efficiency, equal treatment of equals in
welfare, and strategy-proofness implies choosing an Equally Distributed Pair-
wise Pivotal rule.
Theorem 1.2. A single-valued rule satisfies Pareto-efficiency, equal treat-
ment of equals in welfare, and strategy-proofness if and only if it is an Equally
Distributed Pairwise Pivotal rule.
The following paragraphs establish the independence of the axioms in Theo-
rem 1.2.
(i) Let ϕ be a rule such that for each c ∈ C, if (σ, t) = ϕ(c), then σ ∈ Q∗(c).
Let i ∈ N if σi 6= 1 and for each {j, k} ⊂ N are such that σj = σi − 1 and
σk = σi + 1, then αi ∈ [cj, ck] and ti =
∑
l∈Pi(σ)∪{i} αl, and if σi = 1, then
ti = αi where in each case α ∈ RN is chosen so as to achieve
∑
l∈N tl = 0. Any
such rule satisfies all the axioms of Theorem 1.2 but strategy-proofness (Chun,
2004b).
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(ii) Let ϕ be a Groves rule associated with h ∈ H such that for each c ∈ C and
let λ ∈ R be such that λ 6= 0 and h1 =
∑
l∈N\{1}(σ
−1
l −1)cl+ 1n−2
∑
l∈N\{1}(σ
−1
l −
1)cl + λ, and for each i ∈ N\{1}, we have hi =
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l − 1)ci +
1
n−2
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l − 1)cl − λ(n−1) . Any such rule satisfies all the axioms of The-
orem 1.2 but equal treatment of equals in welfare.
(iii) Let ϕ be a Groves rule associated with h ∈ H such that c ∈ C and let λ ∈
R+ be such that for each i ∈ N , hi =
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l −1)ci+ 1n−2
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l −
1)cl − λ satisfies all axioms but Pareto-efficiency.
Remark 1.1. Equally Distributed Pairwise Pivotal rules satisfy no-envy. Thus,
as no-envy implies equal treatment of equals in welfare, we prove that only
single-valued Equally Distributed Pairwise Pivotal rules satisfy Pareto-efficiency,
equal treatment of equals in welfare, and strategy-proofness.
Next, we show that if we impose the stronger condition of coalitional
strategy-proofness, even with efficiency of queues, then we have a negative
result.
Theorem 1.3. No rule satisfies efficiency of queues and coalitional strategy-
proofness.
The following paragraphs establish examples of rules that satisfy only one
of the axioms in Theorem 1.3.
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(i) Equally Distributed Pairwise Pivotal rule satisfies efficiency of queues but
not coalitional strategy-proofness.
(ii) Any rule that selects the same arbitrary queue and sets the transfer to each
agent equal to zero satisfies coalitional strategy-proofness, but not efficiency of
queues.
Theorem 1.3 implies that no rule satisfies Pareto-efficiency and coalitional
strategy-proofness. It also implies that no rule satisfies Pareto-efficiency, non-
bossiness, and strategy-proofness. Since no-envy implies Pareto-efficiency of
queues6, it follows that no rule satisfies no-envy, non-bossiness, and strategy-
proofness.
1.4.2 Multi-valued rules
Let Φ be a rule. When we allow multi-valuedness of rules, it is possible to give
two agents with equal unit waiting costs equal assignments. We require that
this be the case: If there is another allocation at which two agents exchange
their assignments and the other agents keep theirs, then this allocation should
be selected.
Symmetry: For each c ∈ C, each (σ, t) ∈ Φ(c), and each {i, j} ⊂ N with i 6= j
and ci = cj, if (σ
′, t′) ∈ Z(N) such that (σ′i, t′i) = (σj, tj), (σ′j, t′j) = (σi, ti),
6Assume that ϕ satisfies no-envy. Let c ∈ C, (σ, t) = ϕ(c), {i, j} ⊂ N , with i 6= j be
such that ci > cj but σi > σj . By no-envy, we have ui(σi, ti) ≥ ui(σj , tj) and uj(σj , tj) ≥
uj(σi, ti). Then, (σi − σj)ci + tj ≤ ti ≤ (σi − σj)ci that contradicts ci > cj .
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and for each l ∈ N\{i, j}, we have (σ′l, t′l) = (σl, tl), then (σ′, t′) ∈ Φ(c).
This second requirement is that if we permute agents’ unit waiting costs,
we should permute the selected assignments accordingly. Formally, let Π be
the set of all permutations on N . For each pi ∈ Π and each c ∈ RN+ , let
pi(c) ≡ (cpi(i))i∈N and pi(σ, t) ≡ (σpi(i), tpi(i))i∈N .
Anonymity: For each c ∈ C, each (σ, t) ∈ Φ(c), and each pi ∈ Π, we have
pi(σ, t) ∈ Φ(pi(c)).
Single- and multi-valued rules may satisfy equal treatment of equals in welfare.
However, only multi-valued rules may satisfy symmetry. Indeed, symmetry
is necessary for agents’ names not to matter. Thus, the presence of indi-
visibilities implies that we may require anonymity of rules only if we allow
multi-valuedness.
For multi-valued rules, strategy-proofness has to be redefined. To com-
pare the welfare levels derived from two sets of feasible allocations, we assume
that an agent prefers the former to the latter if and only if for each allo-
cation in the latter, there is an allocation in the former that she finds at
least as desirable; and for each allocation in the former, there is an alloca-
tion in the latter that she does not prefer.7 Formally, let Xi be the set of
7Determining how agents rank non-empty sets given their preferences over singletons has
been studied in, e.g., Pattanaik (1973), Barbera´ (1977), Dutta (1977), Kelly (1977), Feldman
(1979, 1980), Ga¨rdenfors (1979), Thomson (1979), Ching and Zhou (2000), Duggan and
Schwartz (2000), and Barbera´, Dutta, and Sen (2001).
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positions and transfers in N × R. Given ci ∈ R+, let Ri(ci) be the prefer-
ence relation on subsets Xi defined as follows: for each {Xi, X ′i} ⊆ Xi, we
have Xi Ri(ci) X
′
i if and only if min(σi,ti)∈Xi ui(σi, ti) ≥ min(σ′i,t′i)∈X′i ui(σ′i, t′i)
and max(σi,ti)∈Xi ui(σi, ti) ≥ max(σ′i,t′i)∈X′i ui(σ′i, t′i). Let Z be the set of all
non-empty subsets of Z(N). For each Z ∈ Z, and each i ∈ N , let Zi ≡⋃
(σ,t)∈Z(σi, ti).
Strategy-proofness: For each c ∈ C, each i ∈ N , and each c′i ∈ R+, if
Z = Φ(c) and Z ′ = Φ(c′i, c−i), then Zi Ri(ci) Z
′
i.
Thus, as in Pattanaik (1973), Dutta (1977), and Thomson (1979), strategy-
proofness requires each agent to find the worst assignment she may receive
when she reveals her unit waiting cost at least as desirable as the worst as-
signment she may receive when she misrepresents it. Furthermore, it requires
each agent to find the best assignment she may receive when she reveals her
unit waiting cost at least as desirable as the best assignment she may receive
when she misrepresents it. The second requirement is also implied by further
basic incentive compatibility requirements. In particular, it is a necessary con-
dition for implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms
(Jackson, 1992, Ching and Zhou, 2002).8
8Formally, an agent does not find misrepresenting her unit waiting cost more desirable
as revealing it if there is no c ∈ C, each i ∈ N , and each c′i ∈ R+ such that for (σ′, t′) ∈
Φ(c′i, c−i)\Φ(c), we have ui(σ′i, t′i) > min(σ,t)∈Φ(c) ui(σi, ti) or for (σ, t) ∈ Φ(c)\Φ(c′i, c−i), we
have max(σ′,t′)∈Φ(c′i,c−i)ui(σ
′
i, t
′
i) < ui(σi, ti).
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Next, we show that a unique rule satisfies Pareto-efficiency, symmetry, and
strategy-proofness and identify the rule. Moreover, this rule satisfies no-envy
and anonymity. For each problem, the rule selects all Pareto-efficient queues
and for each queue, it sets transfers as in the Equally Distributed Pairwise
Pivotal rule. Thus, it is the union of the desirable rules introduced in the
previous subsection. Formally,
The Largest Equally Distributed Pairwise Pivotal rule, Φ∗: For each
c ∈ C, we have (σ, t) ∈ Φ∗(c) if and only if σ ∈ Q∗(c) and for each i ∈ N , we
have ti = −
∑
j∈N\{i}
∑
l∈{i,j}∩Fi(σ) cl+
1
(n−2)
∑
j∈N\{i}
∑
k∈N\{i,j}
∑
l∈{j,k}∩Fj(σ) cl.
For each problem and each Pareto-efficient queue, the transfers set by the
Largest Equally Distributed Pairwise Pivotal rule can be obtained as the trans-
fers set by any rule described in Proposition 1.1. Thus, for each c ∈ C, each
(σ, t) ∈ Φ∗(c), and each i ∈ N , we have
ti = −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − 1)cl +
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l − 1)cl + 1(n−2)
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l − 1)cl
=
∑
l∈Pi(σ)
(σl−1)
(n−2) cl −
∑
l∈Fi(σ)
(n−σl)
(n−2) cl
=
∑
l∈Pi(σ)
cl
2
−∑l∈Fi(σ) cl2 −∑l∈N\{i}∑k∈Pl(σ)\{i} ck−cl2(n−2) .
Furthermore, Theorem 1.4 states that only subcorrespondences of the Largest
Equally Distributed Pairwise Pivotal rule can satisfy Pareto-efficiency, equal
treatment of equals in welfare, and strategy-proofness. They also satisfy no-
24
envy. Then, we prove that the Largest Equally Distributed Pairwise Pivotal
rule is the only rule that satisfies Pareto-efficiency, symmetry, and strategy-
proofness.
Theorem 1.4.
1. A rule satisfies Pareto-efficiency, equal treatment of equals in welfare,
and strategy-proofness if and only if it is a subcorrespondence of the
Largest Equally Distributed Pairwise Pivotal rule.
2. A rule satisfies Pareto-efficiency, symmetry, and strategy-proofness if
and only if it is the Largest Equally Distributed Pairwise Pivotal rule.
The following paragraphs establish the independence of axioms in the sec-
ond statement in Theorem 1.4.
(i) Consider a rule that selects all Pareto-efficient queues and sets each agent’s
transfer equal to the Shapley value of the associated coalitional game, where
the worth of a coalition is the minimum possible sum of its members waiting
costs (Maniquet, 2003). Such a rule satisfies all the axioms of the second
statement of Theorem 1.4 but strategy-proofness.
(ii) Consider any proper subcorrespondence of a rule that is the union of all
the single-valued rules that are Groves’ rules associated with h ∈ H and satisfy
balancedness. Such a rule satisfies all the axioms of the second statement of
Theorem 1.4 but symmetry.
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(iii) Consider a rule such that for each queueing problem and each λ ∈ R+, it
selects a fixed queue and sets each agent’s transfer equal to −λ. Such a rule
satisfies all the axioms of the second statement of Theorem 1.4 but Pareto-
efficiency.
Remark 1.2. The Largest Equally Distributed Pairwise Pivotal rule also sat-
isfies anonymity. Since anonymity implies symmetry and the Largest Equally
Distributed Pairwise Pivotal rule is the union of all the rules that satisfy
Pareto-efficiency, equal treatment of equals in welfare, and strategy-proofness,
it follows that this rule is the only rule that satisfies Pareto-efficiency, equal
treatment of equals in welfare, symmetry, and strategy-proofness.
1.5 Conclusion
Our objective was to identify allocation rules for queueing problems that satisfy
efficiency, equity, and incentive requirements simultaneously on the domain
of quasi-linear preferences in positions and transfers. We proved that the
Largest Equally Distributed Pairwise Pivotal rule is the only such rule. It
is the only rule, together with any of its subcorrespondences, that satisfies
Pareto-efficiency, equal treatment of equals in welfare, and strategy-proofness.
It is the only rule that satisfies Pareto-efficiency, symmetry, and strategy-
proofness. As any of it subcorrespondences, it satisfies no-envy. Furthermore,
26
it satisfies anonymity.
We draw three lessons from these results. First and foremost, queueing
problems are among the few problems in which Pareto-efficiency, a weak eq-
uity axiom such as equal treatment of equals in welfare or symmetry, and
strategy-proofness, are compatible. The natural next step is to determine if this
compatibility extends to other problems, in particular to ones in which agents
have different processing times. However, in queueing problems in which wait-
ing costs vary non-linearly across positions, no rule satisfies Pareto-efficiency
and strategy-proofness (Mitra, 2002).
Second, while efficiency of queues and strategy-proofness leave us with a
large class of single-valued rules, adding as weak equity axiom as equal treat-
ment of equals in welfare imposes a unique way of setting transfers. The open
question is to determine the class of multi-valued rules that satisfy Pareto-
efficiency and strategy-proofness.
Finally, in the queueing problems we studied, simply requiring equal treat-
ment of equals in addition to Pareto-efficiency and strategy-proofness, guaran-
tees further basic fairness requirements. First, it prevents agents from envying
one another. In allocation problems of private goods, equal treatment of equals
in welfare and coalition strategy-proofness together imply no-envy (Moulin,
1993). In general public decision-making problems in which the domain of
preferences is strictly monotonically closed, equal treatment of equals in wel-
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fare, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness together imply no-envy (Fleurbaey
and Maniquet, 1997). However, these results do not apply to the problems we
studied. Indeed, here no rule satisfies Pareto-efficiency and coalition strategy-
proofness. Also, as preferences are quasi-linear in positions and transfers, they
are not monotonically closed. In fact, no rule satisfies Pareto-efficiency, non-
bossiness, and strategy-proofness. Second, it guarantees that agents’ names do
not matter. Finally, it guarantees each agent a minimal welfare level. Indeed,
in allocation problems of at most one indivisible private good per agent, no-
envy implies the identical-preferences lower bound, i.e., each agent should find
her assignment at least as desirable as any assignment recommended by Pareto-
efficiency and equal treatment of equals in welfare when the other agents have
her preferences (Bevia, 1996).
Chapter 2
Matching
2.1 Introduction
We consider two-sided matching markets with contracts as modeled by Roth
(1984) and studied in Hatfield and Milgrom (2005). The model in which the
contracts are introduce into general matching markets, includes classical mar-
riage markets, entry-level labor markets, school admission markets, and auc-
tion markets. Here, we discuss a medical job market with doctors and hospitals
as a matching market with contracts. One of the concerns in matching theory
is the stability. A matching is stable if there is no individual or a pair of set
of agents who can arrange a new matching preferred to the original matching.
We are interested in the stable solution that assigns to each matching market
with contracts its set of stable matchings. We consider a substitutes condition
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which requires when an agent chooses from an expanded set of contracts, the
set of contracts it rejects also expands. If the preferences are substitutable, then
the stable solution is well-defined, (Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005). Therefore,
we impose substitutability on preferences.
We follow the axiomatic approach and analyze solutions under variable
populations and preferences. A test for finding desirable rules involves varia-
tions in the number of agents and we provide two properties. First, we con-
sider population-monotonicity (Thomson, 1983). When there is an exogenous
change in the population, it would be unfair if the agents who were not re-
sponsible for this change were treated unequally. Population monotonicity
represents the idea of solidarity, and requires that if some agents leave, then
as a result either all remaining agents (weakly) gain or they all (weakly) lose.
In particular, we introduce own-side population-monotonicity, which requires
that no agent on one side of the market should benefit from an increase of pop-
ulation in its own side, and other-side population monotonicity, which requires
that no agent on one side of the market should lose from an increase of popu-
lation of the other side. Second, we consider the consistency principle1 which
has been applied to a wide class of economic problems. Suppose an allocation
has been chosen by the solution for the problem we consider, and then a subset
of agents leaves with what they are allocated. Now, consider the remaining
1For an extensive survey on consistency, see Thomson (2005).
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agents and all resources they have collectively received, which form the new
problem. The solution is consistent if it recommends the same bundle to be
allocated to each agent as initially. In other words, consistency is a property
in which some agents are leaving with what they are prescribed by the solution
and if we apply the solution to the reduced economy, then the prescribed allo-
cation does not change for the remaining ones. When applying the consistency
principle, it is necessary to define a new problem with the remaining agents,
which is called a reduced problem. Here, we consider two different ways of
reducing a problem. We introduce strong consistency where we allow any set
of agents to leave unless an agent who has been already matched with some
agents is left alone and weak consistency where we only allow agents to leave
in blocks, i.e., in pair of sets originally matched. Consistency has been studied
in matching markets and Sasaki and Toda (1992) obtain characterizations of
the core of one-to-one matching market. They show that the stable solution
is the only solution which satisfies Pareto-efficiency, anonymity, consistency,
and converse consistency2. Toda (2006) obtains characterization of the core
of many-to-one matching markets.
We also consider Maskin monotonicity studied in Haake and Klaus (2005).
This property requires that if the selected allocation has improved in the new
2A solution is conversely-consistent if for each problem and each allocation for that prob-
lem, if the restriction of the allocation to each subgroup of two matched pairs is among the
recommendations made by the solution for the four-agent reduced problem and the alloca-
tion, then the allocation should be one of the recommendations for the original problem.
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preference relation, then the rule should select the same allocation when the
new preference relation is announced. Maskin monotonicity is a necessary but
not sufficient condition for Nash implementability. Haake and Klaus (2005)
shows that the stable solution is Maskin monotonic and any solution that
is Pareto-efficient, individual rational, Maskin monotonic contains the stable
solution.
We prove that the stable solution is the only rule that satisfies unanimity,
own-side population-monotonicity, and Maskin-monotonicity. Moreover, if a
rule satisfies unanimity, own-side population-monotonicity, other-side popula-
tion monotonicity, and weak consistency, then it is a subsolution of the stable
solution. In a recent paper, Toda (2006) obtains similar results in two-sided
many-to-one matching markets.
We also analyze immunity of solutions to strategic behavior such as to
misreporting the availability of contracts held by the hospitals, and misrep-
resenting preferences by doctors and hospitals. Postlewaite (1979) introduces
destruction-proofness in the context of exchange economies and shows that
there is no solution which is Pareto-efficient, individually rational, and destruction-
proof. There is no solution which is no-envy in trades and ε-witholding-proof
(Thomson, 1987). It is easy to find examples that the Walrasian rule is not
destruction-proof in classical private goods economies and the Lindahl rule is
not destruction-proof in classical public goods economies. In exchange mar-
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kets with heterogeneous indivisible goods and agents with separable prefer-
ences, Pareto-efficiency and hiding-proofness together imply individual ratio-
nality and there is no rule which is Pareto-efficient, individually rational, and
destruction-proof (Atlamaz and Klaus, 2005). When there are at least two
firms and three workers, there exists no matching rule that is stable and non-
manipulable via capacities in two-sided many to one matchings (So¨nmez, 1997).
However, there are some rules that are Pareto-efficient, individually rational,
and non-manipulable via capacities.
We introduce destruction-proofness, and study destruction-proofness and
strategy-proofness in matching markets with contracts. We show that if the
hospitals’ preferences satisfy the substitute condition, then the doctor-optimal
solution is not destruction-proof and the hospital-optimal solution is destruction-
proof.
Alcalde and Barbera` (1994) show that there is no matching rule that is
Pareto-efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof. They consider do-
main of preferences satisfying top dominance condition. Consider a pair of
preference relations and a pair of individually rational alternatives. Assume
that first alternative is preferred to the second under the first preference rela-
tion and the second alternative is preferred to the first under the second pref-
erence relation. The condition requires that there is no other alternative such
that it is preferred to the first alternative under the first preference relation
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and is preferred to the second alternative under the second preference rela-
tion. They also show that if the preference of firms are responsive and satisfy
top-dominance condition, then the worker-optimal solution is Pareto-efficient,
individually rational, and strategy-proof. We also impose another restriction
on preferences of firms, the law of aggregate demand. This law states that as
more contracts are available, the firms should take on (weakly) more contracts.
In other words, if the set of possible contracts expands, then the total number
of contracts chosen by firm either rises or stays the same. This property for
a worker is implied by revealed preference, since each worker chooses at most
one contract. If the firms’ preferences satisfy the law of aggregate demand
and the substitutes condition, then for worker-optimal solution, it is domi-
nant strategy for workers to reveal truthfully their preferences over contracts.
However, it is not a dominant strategy for firms to truthfully reveal, even for
firm-optimal solution (Hatfield and Milgrom (2005)). We also consider top-
dominance condition. We show that if the hospitals’ preferences satisfy the
substitute condition, the law of aggregate demand, and the top-dominance
condition then the doctor-optimal solution is the only solution satisfying sta-
bility and strategy-proofness. 3 In two-sided matching markets with contracts
3Haeringer and Wooders (2004) studies a decentralized job market model where firms
propose sequentially a (unique) position to some workers. Successful candidates then decide
whether to accept the offers, and departments whose positions remain unfilled propose to
other candidates. They provide a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium out-
comes and the subgame perfect equilibria. While the set of Nash equilibria outcomes contain
all individually rational matchings, it turns out that in most cases considered all subgame
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and more than two agents the stable correspondence is Nash implementable
(Haake and Klaus, 2005). Note that they only impose substitute condition,
whereas in order to have dominant strategy implementation, we need to impose
the substitute condition, the law of aggregate demand, and the top-dominance
condition.
In Section 2.2, we introduce the model where we discuss a medical job
market with doctors and hospitals as a matching market with contracts. Sec-
tions 3.3 and 2.4 introduce the properties of solutions and some well-known
solutions in the literature. Section 2.5 provides the results and all proofs are
provided in the Appendix B. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Model
There are D the infinite set of potential doctors and H the infinite set of
potential hospitals. LetD andH be the sets of all finite subsets of D andH, and
let D and H be generic sets of doctors and hospitals. Let d and h be a generic
doctor and hospital. Also, let i, j be generic agents. A contract is a match
between a doctor and a hospital that specifies the conditions of employment.
Let X be the infinite set of potential contracts and X be the set of all finite
subsets of X. Let X be a generic set of contracts and x a generic contract.
perfect equilibria yield a unique outcome, the worker-optimal solution.
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Let µ : X → D × H be the function that specifies the bilateral structure of
each contract. That is, µ assigns to each contract x ∈ X the ordered pair
(d, h) ∈ D × H that lists the doctor and the hospital between whom contract
x is established. Clearly, for each pair {x, x′} ⊆ X, if x 6= x′ and µ(x) = µ(x′),
then x and x′ are contracts between the same doctor and hospital but under
different terms. Also, each agent may stay unmatched, i.e., each doctor may
stay unemployed and each hospital may employ no doctor. We refer to this
situation as the null contract. We denote it by ∅ ∈ X. Also, by abuse of
language, we say that the null contract matches the agent to herself. Then, for
each i ∈ D∪H, let Xi be the set of all sets of contracts of X in which i is matched
(including to herself), i.e., Xi ≡ {X ∈ X : for each x ∈ X, there is j ∈
D ∪ H such that µ(x) = (i, j) or µ(x) = (j, i)}. Also, for each i ∈ D ∪ H and
each X ∈ X , let Xi be the set of all contracts of X in which i is matched, i.e.,
Xi ≡ {x ∈ X : there is j ∈ D ∪ H such that µ(x) = (i, j) or µ(x) = (j, i)}.
We assume that each doctor is matched at most one hospital, whereas each
hospital may be matched to several doctors. That is, we assume that, for each
d ∈ D and each X ∈ Xd, we have |X| ≤ 1.
Each doctor d ∈ D has preferences over X∪{∅}, described by a total order
Rd.4 Let Rd be the set of all preferences of agent d ∈ D. For each d ∈ D
4That is, Rd is a binary relation that satisfies completeness (for each x′, x′′ ∈ X ∪ {∅},
either x′Rdx′′ or x′′Rdx′), transitivity (for each x′, x′′, x′′′ ∈ X∪{∅}, if x′Rdx′′ and x′′Rdx′′′,
then x′Rdx′′′), and antisymmetry (for each x′, x′′ ∈ X ∪ {∅} with x′ 6= x′′, either x′Pdx′′ or
x′′Pdx′).
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and each Rd ∈ Rd, C(.,Rd) : X → Xd is the choice function of agent d with
preferences Rd that assigns to each set of contracts X ∈ X the most preferred
contract C(X,Ri) ∈ Xd. Formally, for each X ∈ X , we have C(X,Rd) ≡
maxRd{x ∈ Xd}. Each hospital h ∈ H has preferences over Xh, described by a
total order Rh.5 Let Rh be the set of all preferences of agent h ∈ H. For each
h ∈ H and each Rh ∈ Rh, C(.,Rh) : X → Xh is the choice set correspondence
of agent h with preferences Rh that assigns to each set of contracts X ∈ X
the most preferred subset of contracts C(X,Rh) ⊆ Xh (including the null
contract). Formally, for each X ∈ X , we have C(X,Rh) ≡ maxRh{X ′ ⊆ Xh}.
We impose two conditions on hospitals’ preferences.
• Rh is substitutable if for each X,X ′ ∈ Xh with X ′ ( X, we have X ′ ∩
C(X,Rh) ⊆ C(X ′,Rh).
• Rh satisfy the law of aggregate demand if for all X ′′ ⊆ X ′, we have
|C(X ′′,Rh)| ≤ |C(X ′,Rh)|.
Also, for each i ∈ D∪H and each X ∈ X , let Ri|Xi be the reduced set of all
preferences of Ri relative to Xi and, each X ∈ X , let R|X =
∏
i∈D∪HRi|Xi be
the reduced set of all preferences profiles of R relative to X. Next, we consider
a domain restriction.
5That is, Rh is a binary relation that satisfies completeness (for each X ′, X ′′ ∈ Xh, either
X ′RhX ′′ or X ′′RhX ′), transitivity (for each X ′, X ′′, X ′′′ ∈ Xh, if X ′RhX ′′ and X ′′RhX ′′′,
then X ′RhX ′′′), and antisymmetry (for each X ′, X ′′ ∈ Xh with X ′ 6= X ′′, either X ′PhX ′′
or X ′′PhX ′).
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• The domain of preferences satisfies top-dominance condition if for each
pair {Rh, R′h} ⊆ R, and each pair {X ′, X ′′} ⊆ X such that X ′ Rh ∅,
X ′′ R′h ∅, X ′ Rh X ′′ and X ′′ R′h X ′, then there is no X ′′′ such that
X ′′′ Rh X ′ and X ′′′ R′h X
′′
A matching market with contracts is a quadruple M ≡ (D,H,X,R) such
that:
(i) D ∈ D\∅,
(ii) H ∈ H\∅,
(iii) X ∈ X such that for each x ∈ X, there are d ∈ Dand h ∈ H such
that µ(x) = (d, h),
(iv) R = (Ri)i∈D∪H such that for each i ∈ D ∪ H, there is Ri ∈ Ri such
that Ri = Ri|Xi .
LetM be the set of all matching markets with contracts. An allocation A for
M = (D,H,X,R) ∈ M is a list of subsets of contracts ((Ad)d∈D; (Ah)h∈H)) ∈∏
i∈D∪H 2
Xi such that, for each d ∈ D and each h ∈ H, we have |Ad ∩Ah| ≤ 1
and if there is x ∈ Ad∪Ah with µ(x) = (d, h), then {x} = Ad∩Ah. Let A(M)
be the set of all allocations for M ∈M. A solution ϕ is a correspondence that
assigns to each matching market with contracts M ∈ M a non-empty set of
allocations ϕ(M) ⊆ A(M).
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2.3 Properties of solutions
Our objective is to formulate desirable properties and identify appealing so-
lutions that satisfy these properties together in this section. The efficiency
requirement is standard. There should be no feasible allocation other than the
one selected that each agent finds at least as well as and at least one agent
prefers.
An allocation A ∈ A is Pareto-efficient for M ∈ M if there is no A′ ∈ A
with A′ 6= A such that, for each i ∈ D ∪H, C(A∪A′, Ri) = A′i. Let P (M) be
the set of Pareto-efficient allocations for M . Then,
Pareto-efficiency: For each M = (D,H,X,R) ∈M, ϕ(M) ⊆ P (M).
Next, we require a very mild property which requires that if there is a
feasible allocation which is ranked as the top choice for everyone, then it should
be the only allocation chosen by the rule.
Unanimity: For each M = (D,H,X,R) ∈ M, if there is A ∈ A(M) such
that for each i ∈ D ∪H, C(X,Ri) = Ai, then ϕ(M) = {A}.
One of the concerns in matching theory is the stability and stability of an
allocation requires that there is no individual or a pair of set of agents who
can arrange a new allocation preferred to the original allocation.
An allocationA ∈ A(M) is weakly individually rational forM = (D,H,X,R) ∈
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M if, for each i ∈ D ∪ H such that Ai 6= ∅, we have C(Ai, Ri) 6= ∅. Let
WIR(M) be the set of weakly individually rational allocations for M ∈ M.
Then,
Weak individual rationality: For eachM ∈M, we have ϕ(M) ⊆ WIR(M).
An allocation A ∈ A(M) is individually rational for M = (D,H,X,R) ∈
M if, for each i ∈ D ∪H, we have C(Ai, Ri) = Ai. Let IR(M) be the set of
individually rational allocations for M ∈M. Then,
Individual rationality: For each M ∈M, we have ϕ(M) ⊆ IR(M).
Clearly, for each M = (D,H,X,R) ∈M and each A ∈ A(M), if an allocation
A is individually rational for M , then it is weakly individually rational for M .
Besides, under substitutable preferences, for each M = (D,H,X,R) ∈M and
each A ∈ A(M), if A is individually rational for M , then, for each i ∈ D ∪H
and each x ∈ Ai, we have C({x}, Ri) = {x}, i.e., x is acceptable.6
A doctor d ∈ D blocks A ∈ A(M) only if C(Ad, Rd) = ∅. Also, a pair of
subsets (D′, H ′) ⊆ D × H blocks A ∈ A(M) only if, for each h ∈ H ′, there
6Moreover, consider a smaller domain of separable preferences, i.e., Rh is separable if,
for each X ∈ Xh and each {x} ∈ Xh\X, we have X ∪ {x} Rh X if and only if {x} Rh ∅.
Under separable preferences, for each M = (D,H,X,R) ∈M and each A ∈ A(M), we have
that A is individually rational for M if and only if for each i ∈ D ∪H and each x ∈ Ai, we
have C({x}, Ri) = {x}, i.e., x is acceptable. We define individual rationality as in Haake
and Klaus (2005) because this definition does not depend on the assumptions made on
preferences. One may find other definitions that do. In particular, Toda’s (2006) requires
that, for each i ∈ D ∪H and each x ∈ Ai, we have C({x}, Ri) = {x}. Thus, our definition
and his are equivalent only under separable preferences.
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are D′′ ⊆ D′ and X ′ ∈ Xh with |D′′| = |X ′| and X ′ 6⊆ Ah such that, for each
d ∈ D′′, there is x ∈ X ′ with {x} = C(Ad∪{x}, Rd) and X ′ = C(Ah∪X ′, Rh).7
An allocation A ∈ A(M) is stable for M if and only if
(i) there is no d ∈ D such that C(Ad, Rd) = ∅,
(ii) there is no h ∈ H such that C(Ah, Rh) ( Ah, and
(iii) there is no pair of subsets (D′, {h}) ⊆ D × H such that there is
X ′ ∈ Xh with |D′| = |X ′| and X ′ 6⊆ Ah such that, for each d ∈ D′, there is
x ∈ X ′ with {x} = C(Ad ∪ {x}, Rd) and X ′ = C(Ah ∪X ′, Rh).
Also, if A ∈ A(M) is weakly individually rational forM , then no doctor d ∈ D
blocks A ∈ A(M). Let S(M) be the set of stable allocations for M ∈ M.
Then,
Stability: For each M ∈M, we have ϕ(M) ⊆ S(M).
Next, we turn to the changes in population. The idea of population mono-
tonicity which is introduced in Thomson (1983), requires that when there is
an exogenous change in the population, the agents who were not responsible
for this change should not be treated unequally. Population monotonicity ex-
presses the idea of solidarity, and requires that if some agents leave, then as a
result either all remaining agents gain or they all lose. We apply population
monotonicity when there is only a change in population of one side of the mar-
7Under substitutable preferences, if there is a blocking pair of subsets, then there is
(d, h) ∈ D×H such that there is x ∈ (Xd∩Xh)\(Ad∪Ah) with C(Ad∪{x}, Rd) Pd C(Ad, Rd)
and C(Ah ∪ {x}, Rh) Ph C(Ah, Rh).
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ket. We formulate two properties. The first property requires that no agent on
one side of the market should benefit from an increase of population in its own
side. For M = (D,H,X,R) ∈M, we say that M ′ = (D′, H ′, X ′, R′) ∈M is a
restriction of M if D′ ⊆ D, H ′ ⊆ H, X ′ = X|D′∪H′ ≡ {x ∈ X : there are d ∈
D′ and h ∈ H ′ such that µ(x) = (d, h)}, R′ = (Ri|2X′∩Xi)i∈D′∪H′ . In particu-
lar, if D′ 6= D and H ′ = H, then M ′ is a D-restriction of M , and if D′ = D
and H ′ 6= H, then M ′ is a H-restriction of M . Then,
Own-side population-monotonicity: For each M = (D,H,X,R) ∈ M,
eachM ′ = (D′, H ′, X ′, R′) ∈M, and each A′ ∈ ϕ(M ′), ifM ′ is a D-restriction
of M , then there is A ∈ ϕ(M) such that, for each d ∈ D′, A′d Rd Ad, and if M ′
is a H-restriction of M , then there is A ∈ ϕ(M) such that, for each h ∈ H ′,
A′h Rh Ah.
The second property requires that no agent on one side of the market should
lose from an increase of population in the other side.
Other-side population-monotonicity: For each M = (D,H,X,R) ∈ M,
eachM ′ = (D′, H ′, X ′, R′) ∈M, and each A′ ∈ ϕ(M ′), ifM ′ is a D-restriction
of M , then there is A ∈ ϕ(M) such that, for each h ∈ H ′, Ah Rh A′h, and
if M ′ is a H-restriction of M , then there is A ∈ ϕ(M) such that, for each
d ∈ D′, Ad Rd A′d.
Next, we consider the consistency principle. Suppose an allocation has
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been chosen by the solution for the problem we consider, and then a subset
of agents leaves with what they are allocated. Now, consider the remaining
agents and all resources they have collectively received, which forms the new
problem. The solution is consistent if it recommends the same bundle to be
allocated to each agent as initially. When applying the consistency principle, it
is necessary to define a new problem with the remaining agents, which is called
a reduced problem. Here, we consider two different ways of reducing a problem.
We introduce two properties. The first property allows agents to leave in
blocks only, in pair of sets originally matched. For M = (D,H,X,R) ∈ M,
M ′ = (D′, H ′, X ′, R′) ∈ M and A ∈ ϕ(M), we say that rAD′∪H′(M) is the
type-1 reduced economy of M relative to D′ ∪H ′ at A if:
• D′ ⊆ D and H ′ ⊆ H are such that, for each i ∈ D′∪H ′, either Ai = ∅ or
for each x ∈ Ai, there is no j ∈ (D ∪H)\(D′ ∪H ′) with {x} = Ai ∩ Aj,
• X ′ = X|D′∪H′ ≡ {x ∈ X : there are d ∈ D′ and h ∈ H ′ such that µ(x) =
(d, h)}, and
• R′ is such that, for each i ∈ D′ ∪H ′, we have R′i = Ri|X′i .
Then,
Weak consistency: For eachM = (D,H,X,R) ∈M, eachM ′ = (D′, H ′, X ′, R′) ∈
M, and each A ∈ ϕ(M), we have A|D′∪H′ ∈ ϕ(rAD′∪H′(M)).
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The second property allows any set of agents to leave unless an agent
who has been already matched with some agents is left alone. For M =
(D,H,X,R) ∈ M, M ′ = (D′, H ′, X ′, R′) ∈ M and A ∈ ϕ(M), we say that
rAD′∪H′(M) is the type-2 reduced economy of M relative to D
′ ∪H ′ at A if:
• D′ ⊆ D and H ′ ⊆ H are such that, for each i ∈ D′ ∪H ′, either Ai = ∅
or for each x ∈ Ai, there is j ∈ D′ ∪H ′ with {x} = Ai ∩ Aj,
• X ′ = X|D′∪H′ ≡ {x ∈ X : there are d ∈ D′ and h ∈ H ′ such that µ(x) =
(d, h)}, and
• R′ is such that, for each i ∈ D′ ∪H ′, we have R′i = Ri|X′i .
Then,
Strong consistency: For eachM = (D,H,X,R), eachM ′ = (D′, H ′, X ′, R′),
and each A ∈ ϕ(M), we have A|D′∪H′ ∈ ϕ(rAD′∪H′(M)).
Next, we return to changes in preferences. Let M = (D,H,X,R) ∈ M.
For each i ∈ D ∪ H, each Ri ∈ Ri|Xi , and each A ∈ A(M), if, for each
X ′ ⊆ X with Ai Pi X ′, we have Ai P ′i X ′, then R′i is a Maskin-monotonic
transformation of Ri at Ai. LetMT (Ri, Ai) be the set of allMaskin-monotonic
transformations of Ri at Ai. Also, if for each i ∈ D ∪ H, R′i ∈ MT (Ri, Ai),
then R′ is a Maskin-monotonic transformation of R at A. Let MT (R,A) be
the set of all Maskin-monotonic transformations of R at A. Now, we introduce
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a property which requires that a preference profile changes in such a way that
the selected allocation has improved in the new preference profile, then the rule
should select the same allocation when the new preference profile is announced.
Maskin-monotonicity: For each M = (D,H,X,R) ∈ M, each M ′ =
(D,H,X,R′), and each A ∈ ϕ(M), if R′ ∈MT (R,A), then A ∈ ϕ(M ′).
Finally, we focus on the strategic issues. We assume that for each problem
the solution is single-valued. First, we will consider the case where the hospital
will destruct some of the contracts and be matched in the market according
to the subset of contracts it had initially. A solution is non-manipulable via
destructing contracts or destruction-proof if
Destruction-proofness: For each M = (D,H,X,R) ∈M, each h ∈ H, and
each X ′h ⊆ Xh, we have ϕh(D,H,X,R) Rh ϕh(D,H,X−h, X ′h, R−h, Rh|X′h).
Next, we will consider the case where an agent behave strategically when
announcing the preference. We require that each agent should find her assign-
ment when she truthfully reveals her preference at least as desirable as her
assignment when she misrepresents it. A solution is strategy-proof if
Strategy-proofness: For each M = (D,H,X,R) ∈M, each i ∈ D∪H, and
each R′i ∈ Ri, we have ϕi(D,H,X,R) Ri ϕi(D,H,X,R−i, R′i).
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2.4 Solutions
The solutions identified next have played an important role in the literature.
First, we consider the solution which chooses all stable matchings.
The stable solution: For each M ∈M, we have ϕS(M) = S(M).
Second, we consider the doctor-optimal solution and hospital-optimal solu-
tions. The doctor-optimal solution associates with each profile of preferences
the stable allocation which is preferred by all doctors to all other stable allo-
cations.
The doctor-optimal solution: For each M ∈M, we have ϕD(M) ∈ S(M)
such that for each d ∈ D and A ∈ S(M), we have ϕD(M)d Rd Ad.
The doctors-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley
(1962) can be used to find the doctor-optimal solution. This algorithm can be
outlined as:
Step 1: Each doctor d makes an offer to the firm with her best contract
in X. Each hospital h that receives one or more offers holds the best set
of contracts and rejects the rest. The algorithm terminates if no contract is
rejected. Otherwise, doctors skip to the next step.
...
...
...
Step t: Each doctor d whose contract was rejected at Step t-1 proposes to
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the hospital with the best acceptable contract to which she has not proposed
before. Each hospital d holds the best set of contracts among the ones it
receives at this step and the ones it was holding from the previous step. It
rejects the rest. The algorithm terminates if no offer is rejected by any hospital.
Otherwise, doctors skip to the next step.
When the algorithm terminates, the tentatively held contracts are realized
as assignments.
Symmetrically, we can define the hospital-optimal solution. It associates
with each profile of preferences the stable allocation which is preferred by
all hospitals to all other stable allocations. The hospitals-proposing deferred
acceptance algorithm can be used to find the hospital-optimal solution.
The hospital-optimal solution: For eachM ∈M, we have ϕH(M) ∈ S(M)
such that for each h ∈ H and A ∈ S(M), we have ϕH(M)h Rh Ah.
2.5 Results
First, we show that the stable solution satisfies the properties listed above.
Proposition 2.1. The stable solution satisfies unanimity, individual rational-
ity, own-side population-monotonicity, other-side population-monotonicity,
Maskin monotonicity, and weak consistency.
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Next, we show that if any two agents’ best choice is to match together, then
they should match at each problem whenever the solution satisfies unanimity
and own-side population-monotonicity.
Lemma 2.1. Let ϕ be a rule satisfying unanimity and own-side population-
monotonicity. Then, for each M = (D,H,X,R) ∈ M, each A ∈ ϕ(M), and
each h ∈ H such that for each x ∈ C(X,Rh), there is d ∈ D with {x} =
C(X,Rd), we have Ah = C(X,Rh).
The next proposition establishes a relationship between the properties.
When we impose an efficiency property, a solidarity property and an incentive
property, we get a necessary condition for stability.
Proposition 2.2. If a rule ϕ satisfies unanimity, own-side population-monotonicity,
and Maskin-monotonicity, then ϕ satisfies weak individual rationality.
Proposition 2.3. A rule ϕ satisfies weak individual rationality, unanimity,
own-side population-monotonicity, and Maskin-monotonicity if and only if
ϕ = ϕS.
Using Propositions 2.1 and 2.3, we can now state our first result.
Theorem 2.1. A rule ϕ satisfies unanimity, own-side population-monotonicity,
and Maskin-monotonicity if and only if ϕ = ϕS.
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The axioms of Theorem 2.1 are independent of each other. The solution
that chooses all possible matchings satisfies own-side population-monotonicity,
Maskin-monotonicity, but not unanimity. The solution that chooses all Pareto-
efficient matchings satisfies unanimity, Maskin-monotonicity, but not own-side
population-monotonicity. The union of the doctor-optimal solution and the
hospital-optimal solution satisfies unanimity, own-side population-monotonicity
but not Maskin-monotonicity.
Next, we turn to weak consistency and show that a symmetric result
to Proposition 2.2 holds when we impose weak consistency and other-side
population-monotonicity instead of Maskin-monotonicity.
Proposition 2.4. Let ϕ be a rule satisfying weak individual rationality, una-
nimity, own-side population-monotonicity, other-side population-monotonicity,
and weak consistency. Then, ϕ ⊆ ϕS.
The next proposition establishes a relationship between the properties.
When we impose an efficiency property, a solidarity property and an invariance
property, we get a necessary condition for stability.
Proposition 2.5. Let ϕ be a rule satisfying unanimity, own-side population-
monotonicity, and weak consistency. Then, it satisfies weak individual ratio-
nality.
Using Propositions 2.1 and 2.4, we can now state our second result.
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Theorem 2.2. Let ϕ be a rule satisfying unanimity, own-side population-
monotonicity, other-side population-monotonicity, and weak consistency. Then,
ϕ ⊆ ϕS.
Finally, we show that why we impose weak consistency rather than any
other form of consistency. The following example shows that if we allow any
subset of agents to leave, then a stable allocation restricted to the new economy
is not a stable allocation.
Example 2.1. Let M = (D,H,X,R) be such that D = {d1, d2, d3}, H =
{h1, h2}, X = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6}, where µ(x1) = (d1, h1), µ(x2) = (d1, h2),
µ(x3) = (d2, h1), µ(x4) = (d2, h2), µ(x5) = (d3, h1), µ(x6) = (d3, h2), and R be
as follows:
Rd1 Rd2 Rd3 Rh1 Rh2
x1 x3 x5 {x1, x3} {x2, x6}
x2 x4 x6 {x3, x5} {x6}
∅ ∅ ∅ {x3} ∅
{x5}
{x1}
∅
Let ϕ = ϕS. Consider the stable allocation A = ({x1}, {x3}, {x6}, ; {x1, x3}, {x6}).
Let M ′ = (D′, H ′, X ′, R′) be such that D′ = {d3}, H ′ = {h1, h2}, X ′ =
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{x5, x6}, and R′ = (Ri|X′)i∈D′∪H′. Then, A|D′∪H′ = {{x6}; ∅, {x6}} is not
stable because (d3, h1) is a blocking pair, since d3 prefers x5 to x6 and h1
prefers {x5} to ∅. Let M ′′ = (D′′, H ′′, X ′′, R′′) be such that D′ = {d1, d2, d3},
H ′ = {h2}, X ′ = {x2, x4, x6}, and R′ = (Ri|X′)i∈D′∪H′. Then, A|D′∪H′ =
{∅, ∅, {x6}; {x6}} is not stable because ({d1, d3}, h2) is a blocking pair, since
d1 prefers x2 to ∅ and h2 prefers {x2, x6} to {x6}.
The next example shows that the stable solution is not strongly consistent.
Example 2.2. Let M = (D,H,X,R) be such that D = {d1, d2, d3}, H =
{h1, h2}, X = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6}, where µ(x1) = (d1, h1), µ(x2) = (d1, h2),
µ(x3) = (d2, h1), µ(x4) = (d2, h2), µ(x5) = (d3, h1), µ(x6) = (d3, h2), and R be
as follows:
Rd1 Rd2 Rd3 Rh1 Rh2
x1 x3 x5 {x1, x3} {x6}
x2 x4 x6 {x3, x5} ∅
∅ ∅ ∅ {x3}
{x1}
{x5}
∅
Let A ≡ ({x1}, {x3}, {x6}; {x1, x3}, {x6}). Clearly, A ∈ ϕS(M). Now, let
M ′ = (D′, H ′, X ′, R′) be such that D′ = {d2, d3}, H ′ = {h1, h2}, X ′ =
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{x3, x4, x5, x6}, and R′ = (Ri|X ′)i∈D′∪H′. Clearly, M ′ is type-2 reduced econ-
omy of M relative to D′∪H ′ at A. Also, A|D′∪H′ = {{x3}, {x6}; {x3}, {x6}} 6∈
S(M ′). Indeed, for the pair of subsets ({d2, d3}, {h1}) ⊂ D × H, there is
{x3, x5} ∈ Xh1 with |{d2, d3}| = |{x3, x5}| and {x3, x5} 6⊆ Ah1 such that
{x3} = C(Ad2∪{x3}, Rd2), {x5} = C(Ad3∪{x3}, Rd3), and {x3, x5} = C(Ah1∪
{x3, x5}, Rh1). Thus, ({d2, d3}, {h1}) blocks A|D′∪H′.
Next, consider the domain of separable preference which is a subdomain of
substitutable preferences. The preference relation Rh is separable if, for each
X ∈ Xh and each {x} ∈ Xh\X, we have X∪{x} Rh X if and only if {x} Rh ∅.
We have the following result:
Proposition 2.6. On the domain of separable preferences, the stable solution
is strongly consistent.
Next, we show that the doctor-optimal solution ϕD(M) is not destruction-
proof.
Proposition 2.7. The doctor-optimal solution ϕD(M) is not destruction-
proof.
Proof. Let M = (D,H,X,R) ∈ M be such that D = {d1, d2}, H = {h1, h2},
Xh1 = {x11, x′11, x21}, Xh2 = {x21, x22}, X = Xh1 ∪ Xh2 where µ(x11) =
µ(x′11) = (d1, h1), µ(x12) = (d1, h2), µ(x21) = (d2, h1), µ(x22) = (d2, h2), and R
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be as follows:
Rd1 Rd2 Rh1 Rh2
x11 x21 {x′11, x21} {x12}
x′11 x22 {x11, x21} {x22}
x12 ∅ {x′11} ∅
∅ {x11}
{x21}
∅
Then, ϕD(M) = (x11, x21; {x11, x21}, ∅). Now assume that X ′h1 = {x′11, x21}
and consider M ′ = (D,H,X ′, R′) ∈ M such that X ′ = X ′h1 ∪ X ′h2 and
R′h1 = Rh1|X′h1 and R
′
h2
= Rh2 . Then, ϕ
D(M ′) = (x′11, x21; {x′11, x21}, ∅) and
ϕDh1(M
′) Rh1 ϕ
D
h1
(M).
Next, we state our results about immunity of solutions to strategic behav-
ior.
Proposition 2.8. The hospital-optimal solution ϕF (M) is destruction-proof.
Now, we state our result on strategy-proofness.
Theorem 2.3. If the hospitals’ preferences satisfy substitutes condition, law
of aggregate demand, and top-dominance condition then a rule ϕ satisfies sta-
bility and strategy-proofness if and only if ϕ = ϕD.
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2.6 Conclusion
We looked for the solutions for matching with contracts that satisfy effi-
ciency, solidarity and incentives requirements simultaneously under variable
populations and preferences. We defined population-monotonicity and consis-
tency axioms, and we also consideredMaskin-monotonicity. AlthoughMaskin-
monotonicity is a requirement on variable preferences, whereas weak consis-
tency and other-side population-monotonicity are requirements on variable
populations, Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 show that Maskin-monotonicity plays the
same role as weak consistency and other-side population-monotonicity. Also,
an interesting question concerns the relationship between efficiency and soli-
darity conditions.
We are also interested in immunity of solutions to strategic behavior such as
to misreporting the availability of contracts held by the hospitals, and misrep-
resenting preferences by doctors and hospitals. Although Theorem 2.3 seems
to be a positive result, one should keep in mind that top dominance condition
is a strong condition.
Chapter 3
Cost Allocation
3.1 Introduction
We consider the problem of sharing the cost of a public facility among agents
who have different needs for it. An example is the so-called “irrigation prob-
lem”. Ranchers are distributed along an irrigation ditch which they use jointly.
A rancher only needs the part of the ditch from his field to the headgate. To
accommodate all ranchers, the ditch should reach the furthest field from the
headgate. How should the cost of maintaining the ditch be shared among the
ranchers? A “rule” is a function that associates with each irrigation problem
an allocation of the cost of maintaining the ditch, which we call a “contri-
butions vector”. For a comprehensive survey of this literature, initiated by
Littlechild and Owen (1973), see Thomson (2005).
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A well-known rule has been employed by ranchers in south-central Montana
for over 100 years. For an empirical and axiomatic analysis on this subject,
see Aadland and Kolpin (1998). It is the “sequential equal contributions”
(SEC) rule1, which works as follows. Imagine that the ditch is composed of
“segments”: the rancher closest to the headgate only needs the part of the
ditch from the headgate to his field, the first segment; the second closest
rancher needs the first segment and the part of the ditch from first segment
to his field, second segment; and so on. All ranchers using a given segment
contribute equally to the cost of the segment, and thus pay the total of the
contributions of each segment that they use. Littlechild and Owen (1973)
show that the contributions vector recommended by the SEC rule coincides
with that prescribed by the “Shapley value” (Shapley, 1953) applied to the
TU game associated to the problem in a natural way. Given an irrigation
problem, we first transform the problem into a TU game, which we call the
associated irrigation game, by defining the worth of each coalition as the cost
of maintaining the ditch used by a rancher with the furthest field from the
headgate in that coalition. We then apply a TU game solution to solve the
game. This yields a payoff vector. Finally, we take this payoff vector as the
contributions vector for the irrigation problem.
Our purpose here is to base axiomatic characterizations of the SEC rule
1The terminology we adopt is borrowed from Thomson (2005). Aadland and
Kolpin (1998) refer to it as the serial cost-share rule.
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on the following variable-population property, which is an application for ir-
rigation problems of a general principle of “consistency”. For a survey of the
literature on consistency and its converse, see Thomson (2000). A number
of authors have provided several axiomatic characterizations of the SEC rule.
Readers are referred to Dubey (1982), Moulin and Shenker (1992), Aadland
and Kolpin (1998), and Potters and Sudho¨lter (1999). Suppose that there are
n ranchers indexed by 1, . . . , n and rancher i’s cost parameter ci represents
the cost of maintaining the irrigation ditch that rancher i uses. For simplic-
ity, assume that c1 < · · · < cn. Consider a contributions vector x chosen by
a rule for the problem just defined. Imagine that rancher 1 pays his contri-
bution x1 and “leaves”, and reassess the situation from the viewpoint of the
remaining ranchers. It is of course natural to think of x1 as a contribution
to the part of the ditch that rancher 1 uses. Since contributing to the part
of the ditch that rancher 1 uses implies contributing to the part of the ditch
that all other ranchers use, the cost parameters of the remaining ranchers are
then revised down by the amount x1. Smallest-cost consistency (Potters and
Sudho¨lter, 1999) of the rule requires that for the reduced problem just defined,
each of the remaining ranchers should contribute the same amount as he did ini-
tially. When other rancher leaves, it is not easy to define the reduced problem.
Thus, the benefit of a characterization is based on smallest-cost consistency.
Potters and Sudho¨lter (1999) propose two types of consistency requirements
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for irrigation problems, “ν-consistency” and “ψ-consistency”. Depending on
which formation of a reduced problem is adopted, we are led to different con-
sistency properties. However, when we focus on the departure of a rancher
with the smallest cost parameter, ν-consistency and ψ-consistency coincide
with smallest-cost consistency. Compared to ν-consistency and ψ-consistency,
smallest-cost consistency is natural and no controversial at all.
In addition to smallest-cost consistency, we consider the following desirable
properties. The first property is a symmetry property, “equal treatment of
equals”: two ranchers with the same cost parameters should contribute equal
amounts. The second property is an independence property, “independence of
followers”: if the cost parameters of all ranchers other than the ranchers before
a segment increase by the same positive amount, then the ranchers before the
segment should contribute the same amounts as they did initially. The third
one is a lower bound requirement on each rancher’s contribution. Imagine,
for each rancher separately, that his cost parameter is the smallest. We then
divide his cost parameter by the numbers of ranchers. (Note that any segment
the rancher uses is jointly used by all other ranchers. Thus, an equal share of
the cost parameter of the rancher is very natural.) Equal share lower bound
of the rule requires that each rancher should contribute at least as much as
an equal share of his cost parameter. The last one is a monotonicity property,
“cost monotonicity”: if a rancher’s cost parameter increases, all other ranchers
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should contribute at most as much as they did initially.
We establish two characterizations of the SEC rule: (i) it is the only rule
satisfying equal treatment of equals, independence of followers, and smallest-
cost consistency, and (ii) it is the only rule satisfying equal share lower bound,
cost monotonicity, and smallest-cost consistency.
In Section 3.2, we formally introduce the model and the properties of solu-
tions. Section 3.4 provides the results, proofs and the independence of axioms.
3.2 Model
There is a universe of “potential” agents, denoted by I j N where N is the
set of natural numbers. Let N be the class of non-empty and finite subsets
of I. Given N ∈ N and i ∈ N , let ci ∈ R+ be agenti’s cost parameter,
and c ≡ (ci)i∈N the profile of cost parameters. An irrigation problem for N ,
or simply a problem for N , is a list c ∈ RN+ . Let CN be the class of all
problems for N . A contributions vector for c ∈ CN is a vector x ∈ RN such
that
∑
i∈N xi = maxi∈N ci, a condition we call “efficiency”, and for each i ∈ N ,
0 ≤ xi ≤ ci, a condition we call “reasonableness”. Let X (c) be the set of all
contributions vectors for c ∈ CN . A rule is a function defined on ⋃N∈N CN that
associates with each N ∈ N and each c ∈ CN a vector in X (c). Let n denote
the number of agents in N and η : {1, . . . , n} → N be a bijection such that
59
cη(1) ≤ · · · ≤ cη(n). Thus, the agents in N are ordered in terms of their cost
parameters. Note that if several agents have the same cost parameters, then
the order is not unique. By convention, we assume that N ≡ {1, . . . , n} and
c1 ≤ · · · ≤ cn. Our generic notation for rules is S. For each coalition N ′ ⊂ N ,
we denote (ci)i∈N ′ by cN ′ , (Si (c))i∈N ′ by SN ′ (c), and so on. The terminology
we adopt in this paper is borrowed from Thomson (2005)
3.3 Sequential equal contributions rule and prop-
erties of rules
We now introduce the sequential equal contributions rule.
Sequential equal contributions rule, SEC: For each N ∈ N , each c ∈ CN ,
and each i ∈ N ,
SECi(c) ≡ c1
n
+
c2 − c1
n− 1 + · · ·+
ci − ci−1
n− i+ 1 .
The SEC rule satisfies the following properties informally defined in the
introduction.
Equal treatment of equals: For each N ∈ N , each c ∈ CN , and each pair
{i, j} ⊆ N , if ci = cj, then Si(c) = Sj(c).
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Equal share lower bound: For each N ∈ N , each c ∈ CN , and each i ∈ N ,
Si(c) ≥ cin .
Independence of followers: For each N ∈ N , each c ∈ CN , each c′ ∈ CN ,
each i ∈ N , and each δ ≥ 0, if for each j ∈ {1, . . . , i}, c′j = cj and for each
j ∈ N\{1, . . . , i}, c′j = cj + δ, then for each j ∈ {1, . . . , i}, Sj(c) = Sj(c′).2
Cost monotonicity: For each N ∈ N , each c ∈ CN , each c′ ∈ CN , and
i ∈ N , if c′i ≥ ci and for each j ∈ N\{i}, c′j = cj, then for each j ∈ N\{i},
Sj(c
′) ≤ Sj(c).3
Next is the central property to our analysis. Let N ∈ N , c ∈ CN , x ∈ X (c),
and i∗ ∈ {i ∈ N | for each k ∈ N , ci ≤ ck }. The reduced problem of c with
respect to N ′ ≡N\ {i∗} and x, rxN ′ (c), is defined by setting for each j ∈ N ′,
(rxN ′ (c))j ≡ cj − xi∗ .
Smallest-cost consistency: For each N ∈ N , each c ∈ CN , and each N ′ ⊂
2A weaker version of independence of followers can be obtained by restricting attention to
an agent with the largest cost parameter. This new property together with efficiency implies
an additivity property, “last-agent cost additivity”: if the cost parameter of an agent with
the largest cost parameter increases by a positive amount, the agent’s contribution should
increase by an equal amount. A stronger version of independence of followers, “independence
of at-least-as-large costs” (Moulin and Shenker, 1992), can be obtained by only requiring
that the cost parameters of those agents with larger cost parameters than agent i’s increase
by a positive amount rather than an equal amount.
3This property is introduced by Thomson (2005). The property is a complement of
“individual cost monotonicity” (Potters and Sudho¨lter, 1999), which is defined as follow:
under the same hypotheses, agent i should pay at least as much as he did initially.
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N , if x ≡ S (c), then rxN ′ (c) ∈ CN ′ and xN ′ = S (rxN ′ (c)).
Remark 1: Reasonableness and smallest-cost consistency together imply ef-
ficiency.
3.4 Results
Our first result is that the SEC rule is the only rule satisfying equal treatment
of equals, independence of followers, and smallest-cost consistency. To prove
this characterization, we use the fact that the SEC rule satisfies the following
monotonicity property. If the cost parameters of all agents increase by the
same positive amount, each rancher should contribute at least as much as he
did initially.
Uniform-cost-increase monotonicity: For each N ∈ N , each c ∈ CN , each
c′ ∈ CN , and each δ > 0, if for each i ∈ N , c′i = ci + δ, then for each i ∈ N ,
Si(c) ≤ Si(c′).
Since the fact that the SEC rule satisfies uniform-cost-increase monotonic-
ity is an immediate consequence of the definition of the SEC rule, we omit its
proof. We are now ready to prove the announced assertion.
Theorem 3.1. The SEC rule is the only rule satisfying equal treatment of
equals, independence of followers, and smallest-cost consistency.
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Proof. Clearly, the SEC rule satisfies the three properties above.4 Conversely,
let S be a rule satisfying the properties. Without loss of generality, let N ≡
{1, . . . , n} and suppose that c1 ≤ · · · ≤ cn.5 Let x ≡ S(c) and y ≡ SEC(c).
We show that x = y. The proof is by induction on n.
Case 1: n = 1. By efficiency of the rule, x = y.
Case 2: n > 1. The induction hypothesis is that for each N ′ ∈ N and
c∗ ∈ CN ′ with N ′ ⊂ N and |N ′| ≤ n − 1, we have S(c∗) = SEC(c∗). We first
show that x1 = y1. By smallest-cost consistency and the induction hypothesis,
we then conclude that x = y. Let N ′ ≡ N\{1}. We distinguish two cases.
Subcase 2.1: c1 = c2. Suppose, by contradiction, that x1 6= y1. Thus, either
x1 > y1 or x1 < y1. If x1 > y1, then by equal treatment of equals, x2 > y2.
By smallest-cost consistency, x2 = S2(r
x
N ′ (c)) and y2 = SEC2(r
y
N ′ (c)). Since
x1 > y1, then for each i ∈ N ′, (rxN ′ (c))i ≤ (ryN ′ (c))i. Note that |N ′| < n. By
the induction hypothesis, S2(r
x
N ′ (c)) = SEC2(r
x
N ′ (c)). Since for each i ∈ N ′,
(ryN ′ (c))i − (rxN ′ (c))i = x1 − y1 > 0, the two reduced problems rxN ′ (c) and
ryN ′ (c) satisfy the hypotheses of uniform-cost-increase monotonicity. Since the
SEC rule satisfies uniform-cost-increase monotonicity, it follows that x2 ≤ y2,
4In the proof, we only use a weaker version of independence of followers obtained by
restricting attention to the situation when i = 2, and a weaker version of uniform-cost-
increase monotonicity obtained by restricting attention to an agent with the smallest cost
parameter.
5Note that if several agents have the same cost parameters, then of course the order is
not unique. However, our Theorem 1 and the next characterization of the SEC rule do not
rely on any particular ordering of agents.
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in violation of x2 > y2. If x1 < y1, then by a similar argument, we derive the
desired contradiction.
Subcase 2.2: c1 < c2. Let c
′ be such that c′1 = c1 and for each i ∈ N ′,
c′i ≡ ci − (c2 − c1). Let x′ ≡ S(c′) and y′ ≡ SEC(c′). Note that c′1 = c′2. By
Subcase 2.1, x′1 = y
′
1. By independence of followers, x
′
1 = x1 and y
′
1 = y1.
Thus, x1 = y1.
Yeh (2006) shows that the “nucleolus” is the only rule satisfying equal
treatment of equals, independence of followers, and “largest-cost consistency”6.
This result reveals the interest of focusing on an agent with the largest cost
parameter in characterizing the nucleolus. In contrast to Yeh’s result, our
Theorem 1 reveals the interest of focusing on an agent with the smallest cost
parameter in characterizing the SEC rule.
Our second result is another characterization of the SEC rule on the basis
of smallest-cost consistency.
Theorem 3.2. The SEC rule is the only rule satisfying equal share lower
bound, cost monotonicity, and smallest-cost consistency.
6It is a weaker version of ν-consistency (Potters and Sudho¨lter, 1999) obtained by re-
stricting attention to the departure of an agent with the largest cost parameter.
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Proof. Clearly, the SEC rule satisfies equal share lower bound, cost monotonic-
ity, and smallest-cost consistency. Conversely, let S be a rule satisfying the
three properties. Without loss of generality, let N ≡ {1, . . . , n} and suppose
that c1 ≤ · · · ≤ cn. Let x ≡ S(c) and y ≡ SEC(c). We show that x = y. The
proof is by induction on n.
Case 1: n = 1. By efficiency of the rule, x = y.
Case 2: n > 1. The induction hypothesis is that for each (N ′, c∗) such that
N ′ ⊂ N and |N ′| ≤ n − 1, we have S(c∗) = SEC(c∗). We first show that
x1 = y1. By smallest-cost consistency and the induction hypothesis, we then
conclude that x = y. By equal share lower bound, x1 ≥ c1n . Suppose that
x1 >
c1
n
. Let c¯ ∈ CN be such that for each i ∈ N\{1}, c¯i = c1. Let x¯ ≡ S(c¯).
By equal share lower bound and efficiency, x¯1 =
c1
n
. Now, let c¯n ∈ CN be
such that c¯nn = cn and for each i ∈ N\{n}, c¯ni = c¯i. Let x¯n ≡ S(c¯n). By
cost monotonicity, x¯n1 ≤ x¯1. Let c¯n−1 ∈ CN be such that c¯n−1n−1 = cn−1 and for
each i ∈ N\{n − 1}, c¯n−1i = c¯ni . Let x¯n−1 ≡ S(c¯n−1). By cost monotonicity,
x¯n−11 ≤ x¯n1 . Continuing this process, we have c¯2 ≡ c and x¯21 ≤ x¯31. Since x = x¯2,
we have x1 = x¯
2
1 ≤ x¯31 ≤ · · · ≤ x¯n1 = c1n , which contradicts to the assumption
of x1 >
c1
n
. Thus, x1 =
c1
n
.
The following paragraphs establish the independence of axioms in Theo-
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rem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2. To show this, we consider several rules. The first
rule is the constrained egalitarian rule (Aadland and Kolpin, 1998).7 Start by
requiring equal contributions from all agents in N until there are γ1 ∈ R+ and
k1 ∈ N such that k1γ1 = ck1 (if there are several such k1, select the largest).
Then, each i ∈ {1, ..., k1} pays γ1. Continue by requiring equal contributions
from members of {k1 + 1, ..., n} until there are γ2 ∈ R+ and k2 ∈ N such that
k1γ1+(k2− k1)γ2 = ck2 (if there are several such k2, select the largest). Then
each i ∈ {k1 + 1, ..., k2} pays γ2. Continue in this way until the total amount
collected is cn. This algorithm can be expressed as follows.
Constrained Egalitarian rule, CE: For each N ∈ N and each c ∈ CN ,
CE1(c) ≡ min
{
c1
1
, · · · , cn
n
}
CEi(c) ≡ min
{
ck−
Pi−1
p=1 CEp(c)
k−i+1 | i ≤ k ≤ n
}
2 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
CEn(c) ≡ cn −
∑n−1
p=1 CEp (c) .
The second rule makes one of the agents with the largest cost param-
eter pay the entire cost (Potters and Sudho¨lter, 1999). Let Π denote the
class of strict and complete order on N , with generic element ≺. The no-
tation i ≺ j means that agent i has priority over agent j. Given N ∈ N
7Aadland and Kolpin (1998) name this rule as the restricted average cost-share rule.
Aadland and Kolpin show that the contributions vector the rule chooses coincides with that
prescribed by the “egalitarian rule” (Dutta and Ray, 1989) applied to the associated airport
game.
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and c ∈ CN , let m(c) ≡ {j ∈ N | for each k ∈ N\ {j} , cj ≥ ck } and dN(c) ≡
{ k ∈ m(c) | for each j ∈ m(c), k ≺ j }.
Last-agent rule, LA: For each N ∈ N , each c ∈ CN , and each i ∈ N ,
LAi (c) ≡

0 if i 6= dN(c);
ci otherwise.
The next rule is a “modified sequential equal contributions” rule. When
there are three agents and their cost parameters differ, the rule assigns each
agent an equal share of the smallest cost parameter plus the difference between
his cost parameter and the cost parameter of his immediate predecessor; oth-
erwise, the rule assigns agents the contributions made by the sequential equal
contributions rule.
Modified sequential equal contributions rule, SEC∗: For each N ∈ N ,
each c ∈ CN , and each i ∈ N ,
SEC∗i (c) ≡

Si (c) if |N | = 3 and c1 < c2 < c3;
SECi (c) otherwise,
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where S is defined as follows: Let N ≡ {1, 2, 3}.
S1(c) =
c1
3
S2(c) =
c1
3
+ c2 − c1
S3(c) =
c1
3
+ c3 − c2
The last rule assigns each agent an equal share of his cost parameter, and
then one of the agents with the largest cost parameter pays the remaining
amount to be collected.
S∗: For each N ∈ N , each c ∈ CN , and each i ∈ N ,
S∗i (c) ≡

ci
n
if i ∈ N\{dN(c)};
cdN (c) −
∑
j∈N\{dN (c)}
cj
n
otherwise,
Table 3.1 shows that the properties listed in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 are inde-
pendent.8 For instance, the last-agent rule satisfies independence of followers
and smallest-cost consistency but violates equal treatment of equals. The con-
strained egalitarian rule satisfies equal treatment of equals and smallest-cost
consistency but violates independence of followers. The modified sequential
8The notation “+” (“−”) means that a certain rule satisfies (violates) a certain property.
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Property/Rule CE LA SEC∗ S∗ SEC
Equal treatment of equals + − + − +1
Independence of followers − + + + +1
Smallest-cost consistency + + − − +1,2
Equal share lower bound + − − + +2
Cost monotonicity − + − + +2
Table 3.1: Independence of the properties in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2.
equal contributions rule satisfies equal treatment of equals and independence
of followers but violates smallest-cost consistency.
3.5 Conclusion
Our objective was to identify allocation rules for irrigation problems that sat-
isfy normative requirements simultaneously. We proved that the sequential
equal contributions rule is the only rule satisfying equal treatment of equals,
independence of predecessors, and smallest-cost consistency, and it is the only
rule satisfying equal share lower bound, cost monotonicity, and smallest-cost
consistency. These results provide justification for the usage of the sequential
equal contributions rule by ranchers in south-central Montana for over 100
years. The open question is to consider strategic issues in irrigation problems.
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Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1.1.
Let ϕ be a single-valued rule. Then,
If part:
Efficiency of queues: Let ϕ be a Groves rule. Let c ∈ C and (σ, t) = ϕ(c).
Then, by definition of a Groves rule, there is d ∈ D such that σ = d(c) ∈ Q∗(c).
Strategy-proofness: Let ϕ be a Groves rule. Let c ∈ C, i ∈ N , c′i ∈ R+,
(σ, t) = ϕ(c), and (σ′, t′) = ϕ(c′i, c−i). By definition of a Groves rule, there
is d ∈ D such that σ = d(c) ∈ Q∗(c). Also, there is h ∈ H such that
ti = −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − 1)cl + hi(c−i) and t′i = −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
′
l − 1)cl + hi(c−i). By
contradiction, suppose ui(σ
′
i, t
′
i) > ui(σi, ti). Then, −(σ′i−1)ci−
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
′
l−
1)cl+ hi(c−i) > −(σi− 1)ci−
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl− 1)cl+ hi(c−i). Thus, −
∑
l∈N(σ
′
l−
1)cl > −
∑
l∈N(σl − 1)cl, contradicting σ ∈ Q∗(c).
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Only if part: Let ϕ be a rule satisfying efficiency of queues and strategy-
proofness. Then, by efficiency of queues, for each c ∈ C, if (σ, t) = ϕ(c), then
σ ∈ Q∗(c). Thus, there is d ∈ D such that for each c ∈ C, if (σ, t) = ϕ(c), then
σ = d(c). In what follows, we prove that there is h ∈ H such that for each
c ∈ C, if (σ, t) = ϕ(c), then for each i ∈ N , ti = −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl− 1)cl + hi(c−i).
Let c ∈ C, i ∈ N , and gi : RN+ → R be a real-valued function such that (i) if
(σ, t) = ϕ(c), then ti = −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl− 1)cl+ gi(c). By contradiction, suppose
that c′i ∈ R+, we have (ii) gi(c) − gi(c′i, c−i) > 0. (The symmetric case is
immediate.) Let (σ, t) = ϕ(c) and (σ′, t′) = ϕ(c′i, c−i). By strategy-proofness,
the following inequalities hold:
• ui(σi, ti)− ui(σ′i, t′i) ≥ 0.
• u′i(σ′i, t′i)− u′i(σi, ti) ≥ 0.
By (i),
[−(σi − 1)ci −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − 1)cl + gi(c)]− [−(σ′i − 1)ci −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
′
l − 1)cl +
gi(c
′
i, c−i)] ≥ 0.
Thus, gi(c)− gi(c′i, c−i) ≥ (σi − σ′i)ci +
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − σ′l)cl.
By (i),
[−(σ′i − 1)c′i −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
′
l − 1)cl + gi(c′i, c−i)] − [−(σi − 1)c′i −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl −
1)cl + gi(c)] ≥ 0.
Thus, gi(c
′
i, c−i)− gi(c) ≥ (σ′i − σi)c′i +
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
′
l − σl)cl.
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Altogether,
(iii) (σi − σ′i)c′i +
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − σ′l)cl ≥ gi(c) − gi(c′i, c−i) ≥ (σi − σ′i)ci +∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − σ′l)cl.
Let us rewrite this expression. By efficiency of queues, for each S ⊆ N , if for
each {k, k′} ⊆ S with k 6= k′, we have ck = ck′ and there is no k′′ ∈ N\S such
that k′′ ∈ Bkk′(σ) ∪Bkk′(σ′), then −
∑
l∈S(σl − 1)cl = −
∑
l∈S(σ
′
l − 1)cl. Also,
there is j ∈ N such that σj = σ′i. Thus,
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − σ′l)cl = −sign(σi −
σ′i)
∑
l∈Bij(σ)∪{j} cl.
9 Thus, we may rewrite (iii) as
(iv) (σi − σ′i)c′i − sign(σi − σ′i)
∑
l∈Bij(σ)∪{j} cl ≥ gi(c) − gi(c′i, c−i) ≥ (σi − σ′i)ci −
sign(σi − σ′i)
∑
l∈Bij(σ)∪{j} cl.
Then, we distinguish three cases:
Case 1: (σi − σ′i) = 0. Then, −sign(σi − σ′i)
∑
l∈Bij(σ)∪{j} cl = 0. Thus, by
(iv), gi(c)− gi(c′i, c−i) = 0 contradicting (ii).
Case 2: |σi − σ′i| = 1. Suppose c′i > ci. (The symmetric case is immediate.)
Then, (σi − σ′i) = 1 and −sign(σi − σ′i)
∑
l∈Bij(σ)∪{j} cl = −cj. Thus, by (iv),
c′i − cj ≥ gi(c)− gi(c′i, c−i) ≥ ci − cj. Thus, as c′i > ci, either c′i − cj > gi(c)−
gi(c
′
i, c−i) or gi(c)−gi(c′i, c−i) > ci−cj. Suppose gi(c)−gi(c′i, c−i) > ci−cj. (The
other case is also immediate.) Let c′′i ∈ R+ be such that (v)gi(c)−gi(c′i, c−i) >
c′′i − cj > 0. Let (σ′′, t′′) = ϕ(c′′i , c−i). By (iv) and (v), c′i > c′′i > cj > ci.
9For each a ∈ R, let sign(a) = −1 if and only if a < 0, sign(a) = 0 if and only if a = 0,
and sign(a) = 1 if and only if a > 0.
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Thus, by efficiency of queues, σ′′i = σ
′
i. Thus, (σi − σ′′i ) = (σi − σ′i) = 1 and∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − σ′′l )cl =
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − σ′l)cl = −cj. Also, by the logic of Case 1,
gi(c
′′
i , c−i) = gi(c
′
i, c−i), implying gi(c) − gi(c′′i , c−i) = gi(c) − gi(c′i, c−i). Thus,
by (v), gi(c) − gi(c′′i , c−i) > (σi − σ′′i )c′′i +
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − σ′′l )cl. Thus, −(σi −
1)c′′i −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl−1)cl+gi(c) > −(σ′′i −1)c′′i −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
′′
l −1)cl+gi(c′′i , c−i).
Thus, by (i), u′′i (σi, ti) > u
′′
i (σ
′′
i , t
′′
i ), contradicting strategy-proofness.
Case 3: |σi − σ′i| > 1. By the logic of Case 2, starting from σ′i, we can find
c˜i such that σ˜i is one position closer to σi. We continue by one position at a
time and at each step we obtain gi(c) = gi(c˜i, c−i). Thus, gi(c) = gi(c′i, c−i)
contradicting (ii). ¤
Proof of Proposition 1.1.
Let ϕ be a single-valued rule. Let c ∈ C, (σ, t) = ϕ(c), and i ∈ N . Let
h ∈ H be as in Statement 2. Then,
ti = −
∑
j∈N\{i}
∑
l∈{i,j}∩Fi(σ) cl +
1
(n−2)
∑
j∈N\{i}
∑
k∈N\{i,j}
∑
l∈{j,k}∩Fj(σ) cl
= −∑l∈Fi(σ) cl + 1(n−2)∑j∈N\{i}∑l∈Fj(σ−i) cl
= −∑l∈Fi(σ) cl + 1(n−2)∑l∈N\{i}(σ−il − 1)cl
= −∑l∈N\{i}(σl−1)cl+∑l∈N\{i}(σ−il −1)cl+ 1(n−2)∑l∈N\{i}(σ−il −1)cl (a Groves rule)
= −∑l∈Fiσ cl + 1n−2∑l∈Pi(σ)(σl − 1)cl + 1(n−2)∑l∈Fi(σ)(σl − 2)cl
=
∑
l∈Pi(σ)
(σl−1)
(n−2) cl +
∑
l∈Fi(σ)
(σl−2)−(n−2)
(n−2) cl
=
∑
l∈Pi(σ)
(σl−1)
(n−2) cl−
∑
l∈Fi(σ)
(n−σl)
(n−2) cl (rule in Mitra and Sen, 1998, and Mitra, 2001)
=
∑
l∈Pi(σ)
cl
2
−∑l∈Fi(σ) cl2 −∑l∈N\{i} (n−2σl)cl2(n−2)
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=
∑
l∈Pi(σ)
cl
2
−∑l∈Fi(σ) cl2 − [∑l∈N\{i} (n−σl−1)cl2(n−2) −∑l∈N\{i} (σl−1)cl2(n−2) ]
=
∑
l∈Pi(σ)
cl
2
−∑l∈Fi(σ) cl2 −∑l∈N\{i}∑k∈Pl(σ)\{i} ck−cl2(n−2) (rule in Suijs, 1996).
¤
Proof of Theorem 1.2.
Let ϕ be a single-valued rule. Then,
If part: Let ϕ be a rule satisfying the axioms in the first statement of
Theorem 1.2. Let c ∈ C and (σ, t) = ϕ(c). Then, by Pareto-efficiency,
σ ∈ Q∗(c). By Theorem 1.1, Pareto-efficiency and strategy-proofness im-
ply that ϕ is a Groves rule, i.e., there is (hi)i∈N ∈ H such that for each
i ∈ N , ti = −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − 1)cl + hi(c−i). For (γi)i∈N ∈ H such that ti =
−∑l∈Fi(σ) cl + γi(c−i). In what follows, we prove by induction that γi(c−i) =
1
(n−2)
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l − 1)cl. Then, ti = −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − 1)cl +
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l −
1)cl +
1
(n−2)
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l − 1)cl. Thus, by Proposition 1.1,
ti = −
∑
j∈N\{i}
∑
l∈{i,j}∩Fi(σ) cl +
1
(n−2)
∑
j∈N\{i}
∑
k∈N\{i,j}
∑
l∈{j,k}∩Fj(σ) cl.
Without loss of generality, suppose N = {1, 2, ..., n} and c1 ≥ c2 ≥ ... ≥ cn.
Let i ∈ N . Then,
Basis Step: c = (cn, ..., cn).
By Pareto-efficiency, γ1(cn, ..., cn) + ... + γn(cn, ..., cn) =
n(n−1)
2
cn. By equal
treatment of equals in welfare, γ1(cn, ..., cn) = ... = γn(cn, ..., cn). Thus, for
each j ∈ N , γj(cn, ..., cn) = (n−1)2 cn.
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Step 1: c = (c1, cn, ..., cn).
By Pareto-efficiency, γ1(cn, ..., cn) + γ2(c1, cn, ..., cn) + ... + γn(c1, cn, ..., cn) =
(n−1)n
2
cn. By the basis step, γ1(cn, ..., cn) =
(n−1)
2
cn. By equal treatment of
equals in welfare, γ2(c1, cn, ..., cn) = ... = γn(c1, cn, ..., cn). Thus, for each
j ∈ N\{1}, we have γj(c1, cn, ..., cn) = (n−1)2 cn. This holds for each k ∈ N\{n}.
Thus, for each j ∈ N :
• if j = k, then γj(cn, ..., cn) = (n−1)2 cn;
• if j ∈ N\{k}, then γj(ck, cn, ..., cn) = (n−1)2 cn.
...
Step s: (Induction step) c = (c1, c2, ..., cs, cn, ..., cn).
By Pareto-efficiency, γ1(c2, c3, ..., cs, cn, ..., cn)+γ2(c1, c3, ..., cs, cn, ..., cn)+ ...+
γn(c1, c2, ..., cs, cn, ..., cn)
=
∑
l∈{1,2,...,s}(σl − 1)cl + (n−s)(n+s+1)2 cn.
By Step s− 1, for j ∈ {1, 2, ..., s}, we have
γj(c1, c2, ..., cs, cn, ..., cn) =
∑
l∈{1,2,...,s}\{j}
(σ
{1,2,...,s}\{j}
l −1)
(n−2) cl+
(n−1−(s−1))(n−2+(s−1))
2(n−2) cn.
By equal treatment of equals in welfare, γs+1(c1, c2, ..., cs, cn, ..., cn) = ... =
γn(c1, c2, ..., cs, cn, ..., cn).
Thus, for each j ∈ N\{1, 2, ..., s}, we have
γj(c1, c2, ..., cs, cn, ..., cn) =
∑
l∈{1,2,...,s}
(σ
{1,2,...,s}
l −1)
(n−2) cl +
(n−1−(s))(n−2+(s))
2(n−2) cn.
This holds for each S ⊂ N\{n} with |S| = s. Thus, for each j ∈ N :
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• if j ∈ S, then γj(cS\{j}, cn, ..., cn) =
∑
l∈S\{j}
(σ
S\{j}
l −1)
(n−2) cl+
(n−1−|S\{j}|)(n−2+|S\{j}|)
2(n−2) cn;
• if j ∈ N\S, then γj(cS, cn, ..., cn) =
∑
l∈S
(σSl −1)
(n−2) cl +
(n−1−|S|)(n−2+|S|)
2(n−2) cn.
...
Step n− 1: c = (c1, c2, ..., cn−1, cn).
By Pareto-efficiency, γ1(c2, c3, ..., cn−1, cn)+γ2(c1, c3, ..., cn−1, cn)+...+γn(c1, c2, ..., cn−1)
=
∑
l∈{1,2,...,n−1}(σl − 1)cl.
By Step n− 2, for j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n− 1}, we have
γi(c1, c2, ..., cn−1, cn) =
∑
l∈{1,2,...,n−1}\{i}
(σ
{1,2,...,n−1}\{i}
l −1)
(n−2) cl + cn.
Thus, γn(c1, c2, ..., cn−1) =
∑
l∈{1,2,...,n−1}
(σ
{1,2,...,n−1}
l −1)
(n−2) cl. Thus, we have
γi(c−i) =
∑
l∈N\{i}
(σ
N\{i}
l −1)
(n−2) cl =
∑
l∈N\{i}
(σ−il −1)
(n−2) cl.
Only if part:
Pareto-efficiency: Let c ∈ C and (σ, t) = ϕ∗(c). By definition of ϕ∗ rule,
σ ∈ Q∗(c) and by Proposition 1.1, for each i ∈ N ,
ti = −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − 1)cl +
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l − 1)cl + 1(n−2)
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l − 1)cl.
Thus,∑
i∈N ti =
∑
i∈N [−
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl−1)cl+
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l −1)cl+ 1(n−2)
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l −
1)cl]
=
∑
i∈N [−
∑
l∈Fi(σ) cl +
1
(n−2)
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l − 1)cl]
= −∑i∈N∑l∈Fi(σ) cl + 1(n−2)∑i∈N∑l∈N\{i}(σ−il − 1)cl
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= −∑i∈N(σi − 1)ci + 1(n−2)∑i∈N(n− 2)(σi − 1)ci
= 0.
Strategy-proofness: By Proposition 1.1, ϕ∗ is a Groves rule. Thus, by Theo-
rem 1.1, ϕ∗ is strategy-proof. ¤
Proof of Remark 1. No-envy:10 Let c ∈ C, (σ, t) = ϕ∗(c), and {i, j} ⊂ N
with i 6= j. Then, by definition of ϕ∗, σ ∈ Q∗(c) and by Proposition 1.1,
ti =
∑
l∈Pi(σ)
(σl−1)
(n−2) cl−
∑
l∈Fi(σ)
(n−σl)
(n−2) cl and tj =
∑
l∈Pj(σ)
(σl−1)
(n−2) cl−
∑
l∈Fj(σ)
(n−σl)
(n−2) cl.
Then, we distinguish two cases:
Case 1: σi < σj. Let d ∈ N be such that σj = σi+d. Then, as, by assumption,
1 ≤ σi < σj ≤ n, we have d ≤ n− σi. Also, as σ ∈ Q∗(c), for each l ∈ Bij(σ),
we have ci ≥ cl ≥ cj. Thus,
ui(σi, ti)− ui(σj, tj) = (−(σi − 1)ci −
∑
l∈Bij(σ)
(n−σl)
(n−2) cl − (n−σj)(n−2) cj)
− (−(σj − 1)ci + (σi−1)(n−2) ci +
∑
l∈Bij(σ)
(σl−1)
(n−2) cl)
= (n−2)d−(σi−1)
(n−2) ci − (n−1)(n−2)
∑
l∈Bij(σ) cl −
(n−σi−d)
(n−2) cj
≥ ( (n−2)d−(σi−1)−(n−1)(d−1)−(n−σi−d)
(n−2) )ci
= 0.
Case 2: σi > σj. Let d ∈ N be such that σi = σj+d. Then, as, by assumption,
10Chun (2004b) provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a rule ϕ to satisfy Pareto-
efficiency and no-envy : For each c ∈ N × RN+ and each (σ, t) ∈ ϕ(c), we have σ ∈ Q∗(c),∑
i∈N ti = 0, and for each {i, j} ⊂ N , if σj = σi + 1, then ci ≥ tj − ti ≥ cj . An alternative
proof thus consists in proving that ϕ∗ satisfies this condition. In fact, rules in Suijs (1996)
satisfy this condition (Katta and Sethuraman, 2005). Thus, by Proposition 1.1, ϕ∗ satisfies
this condition.
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n ≥ σi > σj ≥ 1. Also, as σ ∈ Q∗(c), for each l ∈ Bji(σ), we have ci ≤ cl ≤ cj.
Thus,
ui(σi, ti)− ui(σj, tj) = (−(σi − 1)ci + (σj−1)(n−2) cj +
∑
l∈Bji(σ)
(σl−1)
(n−2) cl)
− (−(σj − 1)ci −
∑
l∈Bji(σ)
(n−σl)
(n−2) cl − (n−σi)(n−2) ci)
=
−(n−2)d+(n−σj−d)
(n−2) ci +
(n−1)
(n−2)
∑
l∈Bji(σ) cl +
(σj−1)
(n−2) cj
≥ (−(n−2)d+(n−σj−d)+(n−1)(d−1)+(σj−1)
(n−2) )ci
= 0. ¤
Proof of Theorem 1.3. By contradiction, let ϕ be a rule satisfying the
axioms of Theorem 1.3. We show that ϕ satisfies non-bossiness. Let c ∈ C, i ∈
N , c′i ∈ R+, (σ, t) = ϕ(c), and (σ′, t′) = ϕ(c′i, c−i) be such that (σi, ti) = (σ′i, t′i).
Suppose that there is j ∈ N such that (σj, tj) 6= (σ′j, t′j). Since (σi, ti) = (σ′i, t′i),
we have ui(σi, ti) = ui(σ
′, t′i). By efficiency of queues, σj = σ
′
j. Since (σj, tj) 6=
(σ′j, t
′
j), we have tj 6= t′j. First, suppose tj > t′j. Then, uj(σj, tj) > uj(σ′j, t′j).
Then, there is (c′i, cj) ∈ R{i,j}+ such that ui(σi, ti) = ui(σ′i, t′i) and uj(σj, tj) >
uj(σ
′
j, t
′
j) contradicting coalitional strategy-proofness. Second, suppose tj <
t′j. Then, uj(σj, tj) < uj(σ
′
j, t
′
j). Then, there is (ci, cj) ∈ R{i,j}+ such that
u′i(σi, ti) = u
′
i(σ
′
i, t
′
i) uj(σ
′
j, t
′
j) > uj(σj, tj) contradicting coalitional strategy-
proofness.
Now, we establish two claims:
Claim 1: For each c ∈ RN+ , each i ∈ N , and each c′i ∈ R+, if (σ, t) = ϕ(c) and
(σ′, t′) = ϕ(c′i, c−i) are such that σi = σ
′
i, then (σ, t) = (σ
′, t).
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Let c ∈ RN+ , i ∈ N , c′i ∈ R+, (σ, t) = ϕ(c), and (σ′, t′) = ϕ(c′i, c−i) be such
that σi = σ
′
i. By strategy-proofness, −(σi − 1)ci + ti ≥ −(σ′i − 1)ci + t′i and
−(σ − 1)c′i + ti ≤ −(σ′i − 1)c′i + t′i. Thus, as σi = σ′i, we have ti = t′i. By
non-bossiness, (σ, t) = (σ′, t′).
Claim 2: For each c ∈ RN+ such that for each {j, k} ⊆ N , we have cj 6= ck
if and only if j 6= k, for each i ∈ N , and each c′i ∈ R+ such that for each
j ∈ N\{i}, we have c′i > cj if and only if ci > cj, if (σ, t) = ϕ(c), then
(σ, t) = ϕ(c′i, c−i).
Let c ∈ RN+ , i ∈ N , c′i ∈ R+ be such that for each j ∈ N\{i}, we have c′i 6= cj
and c′i > cj if and only if ci > cj, and (σ, t) = ϕ(c), (σ
′, t′) = ϕ(c′i, c−i). By
efficiency of queues, we have σ′i = σi. By Claim 1, (σ, t) = ϕ(c
′
i, c−i).
Claims 1 and 2 being proved, we now come to a contradiction. Without loss
of generality, suppose N = {1, 2, ..., n}. Let {c, c′} ⊆ RN+ be such that
(i) c1 > c2 > c3... > cn,
(ii) c′2 > c
′
1 > c
′
3 > ... > c
′
n, and
(iii) for each i ∈ N\{1}, c′i = ci.
Let (σ, t) = ϕ(c) and (σ′, t′) = ϕ(c′). By efficiency of queues, for each i ∈ N ,
we have σi = i, whereas σ
′
1 = 2, σ
′
2 = 1, and for each i ∈ N\{1, 2}, we
have σi = σ
′
i = i. Thus, (σ, t) 6= (σ′, t′). By strategy-proofness, u1(σ1, t1) =
t1 ≥ −c1 + t′1 = u1(σ′1, t′1) and u′1(σ′1, t′1) = −c′1 + t′1 ≥ t1 = u′1(σ1, t1). That is,
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t′1 ∈ [t1+c′1, t1+c1]. Thus, agent 1’s transfer depends either on a constant, i.e.,
t1 = t1+ c with c ∈ [c1, c′1], or on its own announcement, i.e., t1 = t1+f(c′1, c1)
with f(c′1, c1) ∈ [c1, c′1]. Clearly, this contradicts strategy-proofness. ¤
Proof of Statement 1 in Theorem 1.4. Let ϕ be a rule. Then,
If Part Let ϕ be a rule satisfying the axioms of Theorem 1.4.1. Let c ∈ C and
(σ, t) ∈ ϕ(c). By Pareto-efficiency, σ ∈ Q∗(c). The Claims 1 and 2 state that
Pareto-efficiency and strategy-proofness imply that there is {h, h} ⊆ H such
that for each i ∈ N ,
• if (σ, t) ∈ argmin(σ,t)∈ϕ(c) ui(σi, ti), then ti = −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl−1)cl+hi(c−i)
and
• if (σ, t) ∈ argmax(σ,t)∈ϕ(c) ui(σi, ti), then ti = −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − 1)cl +
hi(c−i).
Thus, repeating the proof by induction of Theorem 1.2, for each i ∈ N ,
• ti = −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl−1)cl+
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l −1)cl+ 1(n−2)
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l −1)cl
and
• ti = −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl−1)cl+
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l −1)cl+ 1(n−2)
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l −1)cl.
By Pareto-efficiency, for each i ∈ N , ui(σ, t) = ui(σ, t). Thus, for each
i ∈ N , ti = −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl−1)cl+
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l −1)cl+ 1(n−2)
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l −1)cl.
Thus, by Proposition 1.1, for each i ∈ N ,
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ti = −
∑
j∈N\{i}
∑
l∈{i,j}∩Fi(σ) cl +
1
(n−2)
∑
j∈N\{i}
∑
k∈N\{i,j}
∑
l∈{j,k}∩Fj(σ) cl.
Claim 1: There is h ∈ H such that for each c ∈ C and each i ∈ N , if
(σ, t) ∈ argmax(σ,t)∈ϕ(c) ui(σi, ti), then ti = −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − 1)cl + hi(c−i).
For each i ∈ N , let gi : RN+ → R be a function such that (i) for each
c ∈ RN+ if (σ, t) ∈ argmax(σ,t)∈ϕ(c) ui(σi, ti), then ti = −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − 1)cl +
gi(c). By contradiction, suppose that for c ∈ RN+ and c′i ∈ R, we have (ii)
gi(c) − gi(c′i, c−i) 6= 0. Let (σ, t) ∈ argmax(σ,t)∈ϕ(c) ui(σi, ti) and (σ, t) ∈
argmax(σ,t)∈ϕ(c′i,c−i) u
′
i(σi, ti). Then, by strategy-proofness,
• ui(σi, ti) ≥ max(σ′,t′)∈ϕ(c′i,c−i) ui(σ′i, t′i),
• max(σ,t)∈ϕ(c) u′i(σi, ti) ≤ u′i(σi, ti),
• max(σ′,t′)∈ϕ(c′i,c−i)ui(σ′i, t′i) ≥ ui(σi, ti),
• u′i(σi, ti) ≤ max(σ,t)∈ϕ(c)u′i(σi, ti).
Thus, (iii) ui(σi, ti)−ui(σi, ti) ≥ 0 and u′i(σi, ti)−u′i(σi, ti) ≥ 0. By the logic
of Theorem 1.1, (i), (ii), and (iii) together imply a contradiction.
Claim 2: There is h ∈ H such that for each c ∈ C and each i ∈ N , if
(σ, t) ∈ argmin(σ,t)∈ϕ(c) ui(σi, ti), then ti = −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − 1)cl + hi(c−i).
Let c ∈ RN+ , i ∈ N , c′i ∈ R+, (σ, t) ∈ argmin(σ,t)∈ϕ(c) ui(σi, ti) and
(σ, t) ∈ argmin(σ,t)∈ϕ(c′i,c−i) u′i(σi, ti). Let gi : RN+ → R be a function such that
• ti = −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − 1)cl + gi(c) and
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• t
i
= −∑l∈N\{i}(σl − 1)cl + gi(c′i, c−i).
In what follows, we prove that there is hi : R
N\{i}
+ → R such that gi(c) = hi(c−i)
and g
i
(c′i, c−i) = hi(c−i). Thus, gi(c) = gi(c
′
i, c−i).
First, there is hi : R
N\{i}
+ → R such that
• if (σ∗, t∗) ∈ argmin(σ,t)∈ϕ(c) u′i(σi, ti) then t∗i = −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
∗
l − 1)cl +
hi(c−i) and
• if (σ∗∗, t∗∗) ∈ argmin(σ,t)∈ϕ(c′i,c−i) ui(σi, ti), then t∗∗i = −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
∗∗
l −
1)cl + hi(c−i).
Let (σ∗, t∗) ∈ argmin(σ,t)∈ϕ(c) u′i(σi, ti) and (σ∗∗, t∗∗) ∈ argmin(σ,t)∈ϕ(c′i,c−i) ui(σi, ti).
Let g∗i : RN+ → R be a function such that by choosing g∗i appropriately,,
(i) t∗i = −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
∗
l − 1)cl + g∗i (c) and t∗∗i = −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
∗∗
l − 1)cl +
g∗i (c
′
i, c−i).
By contradiction, suppose
(ii) g∗i (c)− g∗i (c′i, c−i) 6= 0.
Then, by strategy-proofness, ui(σi, ti) ≥ ui(σ∗∗i , t∗∗i ) and u′i(σ∗i , t∗i ) ≤ u′i(σi, ti).
By assumption, ui(σ
∗
i , t
∗
i ) ≥ ui(σi, ti) and u′i(σi, ti) ≤ u′i(σ∗∗i , t∗∗i ). Thus,
(iii) ui(σ
∗
i , t
∗
i )− ui(σ∗∗i , t∗∗i ) ≥ 0 and u′i(σ∗∗i , t∗∗i )− u′i(σ∗i , t∗i ) ≥ 0.
By the logic of Theorem 1.1, (i), (ii), and (iii) together imply a contradiction.
This holds for each c′i ∈ R+.
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Second, g
i
(c) = hi(c−i) and gi(c
′
i, c−i) = hi(c−i). By contradiction, suppose
g
i
(c) − hi(c−i) 6= 0. (The other case is immediate.) First, by assumption,
ui(σ
∗
i , t
∗
i ) ≥ ui(σi, ti). Thus, −(σ∗i − 1)ci −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
∗
l − 1)cl + hi(c−i) ≥
−(σi − 1)ci −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − 1)cl + gi(c). Thus, −
∑
l∈N(σ
∗
l − 1)cl + hi(c−i) ≥
−∑l∈N\{i}(σl − 1)cl + gi(c). Thus, by Pareto-efficiency, hi(c−i) ≥ gi(c).
Second, by strategy-proofness, ui(σi, ti) ≥ ui(σ∗∗i , t∗∗i ). Thus, −(σi − 1)ci −∑
l∈N\{i}(σl−1)cl+gi(c) ≥ −(σ∗∗i −1)ci−
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
∗∗
l −1)cl+hi(c−i). Thus,
g
i
(c) ≥ (σi − σ∗∗i )ci +
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − σ∗∗l )cl + hi(c−i). Altogether,
(iv) hi(c−i) ≥ gi(c) ≥ (σi − σ∗∗i )ci +
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − σ∗∗l )cl + hi(c−i).
By Pareto-efficiency, for each S ⊆ N , if for each {k, k′} ⊆ S with k 6= k′, we
have ck = ck′ and there is no k
′′ ∈ N\S such that k′′ ∈ Bkk′(σ)∪Bkk′(σ′), then∑
l∈S −(σl− 1)cl =
∑
l∈S −(σ′l − 1)cl. Also, there is j ∈ N such that σj = σ∗∗i .
Thus,
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − σ∗∗l )cl = −sign(σi − σ∗∗i )
∑
l∈Bij(σ)∪{j} cl. Thus, we may
rewrite (iv) as
(v) hi(c−i) ≥ gi(c) ≥ (σi−σ∗∗i )ci− sign(σi−σ∗∗i )
∑
l∈Bij(σ)∪{j} cl+hi(c−i).
We distinguish three cases:
Case 1: (σi − σ∗∗i ) = 0. Then, −sign(σi − σ∗∗i )
∑
l∈Bij(σ)∪{j} cl = 0. Thus, by
(v), g
i
(c) = hi(c−i) contradicting gi(c)− hi(c−i) 6= 0.
Case 2: |σi − σ∗∗i | = 1. Suppose c′i > ci. (The symmetric case is immediate.)
Then, (σi−σ∗∗i ) = 1 and −sign(σi−σ∗∗i )
∑
l∈Bij(σ)∪{j} cl = −cj. Thus, by (v),
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hi(c−i) ≥ gi(c) ≥ (ci − cj) + hi(c−i). Let c′′i ∈ R+ be such that (vi) gi(c) >
(c′′i−cj)+hi(ci) and c′i > c′′i > ci. Let (σ∗∗∗, t∗∗∗) ∈ argmin(σ,t)∈ϕ(c′′i ,c−i) ui(σi, ti).
Then, by Pareto-efficiency of queues, σ∗∗∗i = σ
∗∗
i . Then,
(σi− σ∗∗∗i ) = (σi− σ∗∗i ) = 1 and
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − σ∗∗∗l )cl =
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − σ′l)cl =
−cj. By (vi),
g
i
(c) > (σi − σ∗∗∗i )c′′i +
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − σ∗∗∗l )cl + hi(ci).
Then, −(σi−1)c′′i −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl−1)cl+gi(c) > −(σ∗∗∗i −1)c′′i −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
∗∗∗
l −
1)cl + hi(c−i).
Thus, u′′i (σi, ti) > u
′′
i (σ
∗∗∗
i , t
∗∗∗
i ). Also, u
′′
i (σ
∗∗∗
i , t
∗∗∗
i ) ≥ min(σ,t)∈ϕ(c′′i ,c−i)u′′i (σi, ti).
Therefore, u′′i (σi, ti) > min(σ,t)∈ϕ(c′′i ,c−i)u
′′
i (σi, ti) contradicting strategy-proofness.
Case 3: |σi − σ∗∗i | > 1. By the logic of Case 2, starting from σ∗∗i , we can find
c˜i such that σ˜i is one position closer to σi. We continue by one position at a
time and at each step we obtain g
i
(c˜i, c−i) = hi(c−i). Thus, gi(c) = hi(c−i)
contradicting g
i
(c)− hi(c−i) 6= 0.
Only if part:
Pareto-efficiency: Straightforward from Theorem 1.2.
No-envy: Straightforward from Theorem 1.2.
Strategy-proofness: Let c ∈ C, i ∈ N , c′i ∈ R+, (σ, t) ∈ Φ∗(c), and (σ′, t′) ∈
Φ∗(c′i, c−i). Then, by definition of Φ
∗, σ ∈ Q∗(c) and by Proposition 1.1,
there is h ∈ H such that for each i ∈ N , hi(c−i) =
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l − 1)cl +
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1
(n−2)
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l − 1)cl =
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
′−i
l − 1)cl + 1(n−2)
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
′−i
l − 1)cl
and ti = −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl− 1)cl+hi(c−i) and t′i = −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
′
l− 1)cl+hi(c−i).
Suppose ui(σ
′
i, t
′
i) > ui(σi, ti). Thus, −(σ′i−1)ci−
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
′
l−1)cl+hi(c−i) >
−(σi−1)ci−
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl−1)cl+hi(c−i). Thus, −
∑
l∈N(σ
′
l−1)cl > −
∑
l∈N(σl−
1)cl contradicting σ ∈ Q∗(c). Thus, ui(σ′i, t′i) ≤ ui(σi, ti). This holds for each
(σ, t) ∈ ϕ(c) and each (σ′, t′) ∈ ϕ(c′i, c−i). Thus, if Z = ϕ(c) and Z ′ =
ϕ(c′i, c−i), then Zi Ri(ci) Z
′
i.
Proof of Statement 2 in Theorem 1.4.
If Part: Let ϕ be a rule satisfying the axioms of the third statement of
Theorem 1.4. Let c ∈ C and (σ, t) ∈ ϕ(c). Then, by Pareto-efficiency, σ ∈
Q∗(c). By Statement 1, Pareto-efficiency and strategy-proofness imply that
there is {h, h} ⊆ H such that for each i ∈ N ,
• if (σ, t) ∈ argmin(σ,t)∈ϕ(c) ui(σi, ti), then ti = −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − 1)cl +
hi(c−i),
• if (σ, t) ∈ argmax(σ,t)∈ϕ(c) ui(σi, ti), then ti = −
∑
l∈N\{i}(σl − 1)cl +
hi(c−i).
By symmetry, for each {i, j} ⊂ N , if c−i = c−j, then hi(c−i) = hj(c−j) and
hi(c−i) = hj(c−j). Thus, for each {i, j} ⊂ N , if ci = cj, then hi(c−i) = hj(c−j)
and hi(c−i) = hj(c−j). This is true for each c ∈ R+. Thus, repeating the proof
by induction of Theorem 1.2, for each i ∈ N , we have ti = −
∑
l∈Fi(σ) cl +
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1
(n−2)
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l − 1)cl and ti = −
∑
l∈Fi(σ) cl +
1
(n−2)
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l − 1)cl.
Thus, by Pareto-efficiency, for each i ∈ N , ui(σ, t) = ui(σ, t). Thus, for each
i ∈ N , we have ti = −
∑
l∈Fi(σ) cl+
1
(n−2)
∑
l∈N\{i}(σ
−i
l −1)cl. Thus, by Proposi-
tion 1.1, ti = −
∑
j∈N\{i}
∑
l∈{i,j}∩Fi(σ) cl+
1
(n−2)
∑
j∈N\{i}
∑
k∈N\{i,j}
∑
l∈{j,k}∩Fj(σ) cl.
Thus, for each c ∈ C, we have ϕ(c) ⊆ Φ∗(c). Thus, by symmetry, ϕ(c) = Φ∗(c).
Only if part: Suppose that for each c ∈ C, we have ϕ(c) = Φ∗(c). By the
second statement of Theorem 1.4, ϕ satisfies Pareto-efficiency and strategy-
proofness. Also, ϕ does not depend on agents’ names. In particular, ti has the
same structure for each i ∈ N . Thus, ϕ satisfies anonymity. ¤
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Clearly, since ϕS is stable, it satisfies una-
nimity and individual rationality. Next, we show that ϕS satisfies own-side
population-monotonicity and other-side population-monotonicity. Let M =
(D,H,X,R) ∈ M and M˜ = (D˜, H˜, X˜, R˜) ∈ M be such that M is the
D-restriction of M˜ . Let AH ∈ ϕS(M) and A˜H ∈ ϕS(M˜) be the hospital-
optimal allocations of M and M˜ , respectively. By Ostrovsky (2005), for each
d ∈ D and each h ∈ H, we have (i) AHd Rd A˜Hd and A˜Hh Rh AHh . Then, by
Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), for each A ∈ ϕS(M), each h ∈ H, and each
d ∈ D, we have (ii) Ad Rd AHd and AHh Rh Ah. By (i) and (ii), for each
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A ∈ ϕS(M), each h ∈ H, and each d ∈ D, there is A′ = A˜H ∈ ϕS(M˜) such
that Ad Rd A
′
d and A
′
h Rh Ah. A symmetric result holds when M is the H-
restriction of M˜ . Thus, ϕS satisfies weak own-side population-monotonicity
and other-side population-monotonicity. By Theorem 1 of Haake and Klaus
(2005), ϕS satisfies Maskin-monotonicity. Next, we show that ϕS satisfies
weak consistency. Let M = (D,H,X,R) ∈ M and (i) A ∈ ϕS(M). Let
M ′ = (D′, H ′, X ′, R′) ∈ M be the type-2 reduced economy of M relative to
D′ ∪H ′ at A. Let A|D′∪H′ = A′. By contradiction, assume A′ 6∈ ϕS(M ′):
Case 1: There is d ∈ D′ such that C(A′d, R′d) = ∅. Then, since for each
d ∈ D′, A′d = Ad, we have C(Ad, Rd) = ∅, which contradicts (i).
Case 2: There is h ∈ H ′ such that C(A′h, R′h) ( A′h. Then, since A′h = Ah,
then C(Ah, Rh) ( Ah, which contradicts (i).
Case 3: There are h ∈ H ′, D˜ ⊆ D′, and X˜ 6⊆ Ah such that for each d ∈ D˜,
there are x ∈ X˜ with {x} = C(A′d ∪ {x}, R′d) and X˜ = C(A′h ∪ X˜, R′h).
Then, since X˜ ⊆ X and A′h = Ah, X˜ = C(Ah ∪ X˜, Rh) and for each d ∈ D˜,
{x} = C(Ad ∪ {x}, Rd), which contradicts (i). ¤
Proof of Lemma 2.1.
Let M = (D,H,X,R) ∈ M. Also, let i ∈ H and J ⊆ D with J 6= ∅
be such that, for each j ∈ J , there is xji ∈ X with {xji} = C(X,Rj) and⋃
j∈J{xji} = C(X,Ri).
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Let M ′ = (D′, H ′, X ′, R′) ∈M be as follows:
– D′ = D ∪ Dˆ such that, for each d ∈ Dˆ and h ∈ H\{i}, there is xdh ∈ X ′
with {xdh} = C(X,Rd) = C(X,Rh),
– H ′ = H ∪ Hˆ such that, for each d ∈ D\J and h ∈ Hˆ, there is xdh ∈ X ′
with {xdh} = C(X,Rd) = C(X,Rh),
– for each x ∈ X ′\X, µ(x) = (d, h) where either d ∈ D\J and h ∈ Hˆ, or
h ∈ H\{i} and d ∈ Dˆ.
Then, (i) for each j ∈ J , C(X ′, R′j) = C(X,Rj) and we have C(X ′, R′i) =
C(X,Ri). Also, by unanimity, ϕ(M
′) = {A′} such that for each d ∈ D′ ∪H ′,
A′d = C(X
′, R′d). In particular, (ii) for each d ∈ D, we have A′d = C(X ′, R′d)
and A′i = C(X
′, R′i).
Let M ′′ = (D′′, H ′′, X ′′, R′′) ∈ M be the D-restriction of M ′ with D′′ = D.
Then, for each d ∈ D′′, the following statements hold:
• By (ii), A′d = C(X ′, R′d).
• C(X ′, R′d) = C(X ′′, R′′d).
• By own-side population-monotonicity, for each A′′ ∈ ϕ(M ′′), we have
A′′d R
′′
d A
′
d.
Thus, for each d ∈ D′′, we have A′′d = A′d. That is, (iii) A′′j = A′j.
Clearly, M is the H-restriction of M ′′. Then, the following statements hold:
• By (iii), A′′i = A′i
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• By (ii), A′i = C(X ′, R′i).
• By (i), C(X ′, R′i) = C(X,Ri) = C(X ′′, R′′i ).
Since ϕ is own-side population-monotonic, for each A ∈ ϕ(M), we have Ai Ri
A′′i . Thus, we have (iv) Ai = A
′′
i . Together, (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) imply
that, for each A ∈ ϕ(M), we have Ai = C(X,Ri). ¤
Proof of Proposition 2.2.
Let ϕ be a rule satisfying the first three of Proposition 2.2. By contra-
diction, assume that ϕ is not weakly individually rational. That is, there are
M = (D,H,X,R) ∈ M, A ∈ ϕ(M) and i ∈ D ∪H such that (i) Ai 6= ∅ and
C(Ai, Ri) = ∅. Let J ≡ {j ∈ D∪H : there is x ∈ Ai such that µ(x) = (i, j)}.
Let M ′ = (D′, H ′, X ′, R′) ∈M be as follows:
– D′ = D, H ′ = H, and X ′ = X,
– for each j ∈ (D ∪H)\{i}, we have C(X,R′j) = Aj, C(X,R′i) = ∅ and for
each X ′ ⊆ X such that X ′ 6= ∅, C(Ai ∪X ′) = Ai.
Clearly, R′ ∈MT (R,A). Thus, by Maskin-monotonicity, A ∈ ϕ(M ′).
Let M ′′ = (D′′, H ′′, X ′′, R′′) ∈M be as follows:
– D′′ ∪H ′′ = D ∪H ∪ {k},
– X ′′ = X ′∪{Xk} where C(X ′′, R′′k) = Xk, for each j ∈ J , there is xjk ∈ Xk
with µ(xjk) = (j, k) such that C(X
′′, R′′j ) = {xjk}, and R′′i = R′i.
By unanimity, ϕ(M ′′) = {A′′} where for each j ∈ D′′ ∪H ′′, A′′j = C(X ′′, R′′j ).
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In particular, (ii) A′′i = ∅.
Clearly, M ′ is a H-restriction of M ′′ if i ∈ H, and M ′ is a D-restriction of M ′′
if i ∈ D. By own-side population-monotonicity and (ii), for each A′ ∈ ϕ(M ′),
A′i = ∅. By (i), A /∈ ϕ(M ′), which contradicts Maskin-monotonicity. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2.3.
Let ϕ be a rule satisfying the axioms of Proposition 2.3. Also, let M =
(D,H,X,R) ∈ M and A ∈ ϕ(M). The proof that ϕ(M) = ϕS(M) is in two
steps.
Step 1: ϕ(M) ⊆ ϕS(M). By contradiction, assume A 6∈ ϕS(M). Since
ϕ satisfies weak individual rationality, there is a blocking pair i ∈ H and
J ⊆ D such that there is X i ∈ Xi with X i 6= Ai and, for each j ∈ J ,
there is xji ∈ X i with {xji} = C(A ∪ X i, Rj) and X i = C(A ∪ X i, Ri). Let
K ≡ {k ∈ D : µ(Ad) = (k, i)}.
Let M ′ = (D′, H ′, X ′, R′) ∈M be as follows:
– D′ = D, H ′ = H, and X ′ = X,
– R′i is such that, for each X
′ ∈ Xi, we have X ′ R′i ∅ if and only if X ′ ⊆
Ai ∪X i.
– for each j ∈ J , R′j is such that, for each x ∈ Xj, we have {x} R′j ∅ if and
only if x ∈ Aj ∪X i and {xji} Rj Aj.
– for each k ∈ K, R′k is such that, for each x ∈ Xk, we have {x} R′k ∅ if
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and only if {x} = Ak.
– for each l ∈ [D\(J ∪K)] ∪ [H\{i}], we have R′l = Rl.
Then, the following statements hold:
(i) R′ ∈MT (R,A).
(ii) C(X,R′i) = X
i.
(iii) For each j ∈ J , C(X,R′j) = {xji}.
(iv) For each k ∈ K, C(X,R′k) = Ak.
(v) X i 6= Ai.
By Lemma 2.1, (ii), (iii), and (iv) imply that, for each A′ ∈ ϕ(M ′), we have
A′i = X
i. By (v), A 6∈ ϕ(M ′), which, by (i), contradictsMaskin-monotonicity.
Step 2: ϕ(M) = ϕS(M). Since ϕ satisfies Maskin-monotonicity, the result
follows from Corollary 1 of Haake and Klaus (2005).¤
Proof of Proposition 2.4.
Let ϕ be a rule satisfying the axioms of Proposition 2.4. Also, let M =
(D,H,X,R) and A ∈ ϕ(M). By contradiction, assume A 6∈ ϕS(M). Then,
since ϕ satisfies weak individual rationality, there are i ∈ H and J ⊆ D such
that there is X i ∈ Xi with X i 6= Ai and, for each j ∈ J , there is {xji} ∈ X i
with {xji} = C(A ∪ {xji}, Rj) and X i = C(A ∪ X i, Rhi). Let K ≡ {k ∈ D :
µ(Ak) = (k, i)} and L ≡ {l ∈ H : there is j ∈ J such that µ(Ak) = (j, k)}.
Also, let J ′ ≡ {j ∈ D : there is l ∈ L such that µ(Aj) = (j, l)}.
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Let Mˆ = (Dˆ, Hˆ, Xˆ, Rˆ) be as follows:
– Dˆ = J ∪K and Hˆ = {i} ∪ L,
– Xˆ = {x ∈ X : there is {j, k} ⊆ Dˆ ∪ Hˆ with µ(x) = (j, k)},
– Rˆ = R|Xˆ .
Then, for each j ∈ J , C({xji} ∪Aj, Rˆj) = {xji} and (i) C(X i ∪Ai, Rˆi) = X i.
By unanimity and own-side population-monotonicity, Lemma 1 holds. Hence,
for each Aˆ ∈ ϕ(Mˆ), Aˆi = X i and for each j ∈ J , Aˆj = xji.
Let M ′ = (D′, H ′, X ′, R′) be as follows:
– D′ = J ∪K ∪K ′ and H ′ = {i} ∪ L,
– X ′ = {x ∈ X : there is {j, k} ⊆ D′ ∪H ′ with µ(x) = (j, k)},
– R′ = R|X′ .
By other-side population-monotonicity and (i), for each A′ ∈ ϕ(M ′), (ii)
A′i R
′
i X
i. Note that M ′ is the reduced economy of M relative to D′ ∪H ′ at
A. Thus, by weak consistency, there is A′ ∈ ϕ(M ′) such that (iii) A′i = Ai.
Then, (ii) and (iii) contradict (i).¤
Proof of Proposition 2.5.
Let ϕ satisfy the first three axioms in Proposition 2.5. By contradic-
tion, assume that ϕ is not weakly individual rational. Thus, there are M =
(D,H,X,R), A ∈ ϕ(M) and i ∈ D ∪H such that Ai 6= ∅ and C(Ai, Ri) = ∅.
Case 1: There are j ∈ D and k ∈ H such that µ(Aj) = (j, k), i = j, and
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Ak Rk ∅. Then, let J = {d ∈ D : there is xdk ∈ Ak such that µ(x) = (d, k)}.
Let M ′ = (D′, H ′, X ′, R′) be as follows:
– D′ = J and H ′ = {k},
– X ′ = {x ∈ X : there is j ∈ J with µ(x) = (j, k)},
– R′ = (Rl|X′)l∈J∪{k}.
By weak consistency, A′ = A|J∪{k} ∈ ϕ(M ′). Let K = {l ∈ J : A′l R′l ∅}. Let
l′ ∈ D\J be such that there is xl′k with µ(xl′k) = (l′, k) and xl′k Rl′ ∅. Let
X˜ =
⋃
l∈K{Al}.
Let M ′′ = (D′′, H ′′, X ′′, R′′) be as follows:
– D′′ = J ∪ {l′} and H ′′ = {k},
– X ′′ = X ′ ∪ {xl′k},
– R′′ = (R′′l )l∈D′′∪H′′ be such that C(X
′′, R′′k) = X˜ ∪ {xl′k}, R′′l′ = Rl′|X′′ ,
and for each l ∈ J , R′′l = R′l.
By unanimity, ϕ(M ′′) = {A′′} where for each l ∈ D′′ ∪H ′′, A′′l = C(X ′′, R′′l ).
In particular, (ii) A′′j = ∅.
Clearly,M ′ is theD-restriction ofM ′′. By weak own-side population-monotonicity
and (ii), for each A′ ∈ ϕ(M ′), A′j = ∅, which contradicts weak consistency.
Case 2: There is h ∈ H such that i = h. Then, let J = {j ∈ D : there is x ∈
Ai such that µ(x) = (j, i)}.
Let M ′ = (D′, H ′, X ′, R′) be as follows:
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– D′ = J and H ′ = {i},
– X ′ = {x ∈ X : there is j ∈ J with µ(x) = (j, i)},
– R′ = (Rk|X′)k∈J∪{i}.
By weak consistency, A′ = A|J∪{i} ∈ ϕ(M ′). Let k ∈ H\{i}.
Let M ′′ = (D′′, H ′′, X ′′, R′′) be as follows:
– D′′ = J and H ′′ = {i, k},
– X ′′ = X ′ ∪ {Xk} where |Xk| = |J |, C(X ′′, R′′k) = Xk, for each j ∈ J ,
there is xjk ∈ Xk with µ(xjk) = (j, k) such that C(X ′′, R′′j ) = {xjk}, and
R′′i = R
′
i.
By Lemma 2.1, ϕ(M ′′) = {A′′} where for each l ∈ D′′ ∪H ′′, A′′l = C(X ′′, R′′l ).
In particular, (ii) A′′i = ∅.
Clearly, M ′ is the H-restriction of M ′′. By own-side population-monotonicity
and (ii), for each A′ ∈ ϕ(M ′), A′i = ∅, which contradicts weak consistency. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2.6.
Let M = (D,H,X,R) and (i) A ∈ ϕS(M). Let M ′ = (D′, H ′, X ′, R′) be
the type-2 reduced economy of M relative to D′ ∪H ′ at A. Let A|D′∪H′ = A′.
By contradiction, assume A′ 6∈ ϕS(M ′).
Case 1: There is d ∈ D′ such that C(A′d, R′d) = ∅. Then, since for each
d ∈ D′, A′d = Ad, we have C(Ad, Rd) = ∅, which contradicts (i).
Case 2: There is h ∈ H ′ such that C(A′h, R′h) ( A′h. Then, by separability,
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there is x ∈ A′h such that ∅ R′h {x} and Ah\{x} Rh Ah, which contradicts (i).
Case 3: There are h ∈ H ′, D˜ ⊆ D′, and X˜ 6⊆ Ah such that for each d ∈ D˜,
there is x ∈ X˜ with (ii) {x} = C(A′d ∪ {x}, R′d) and X˜ = C(A′h ∪ X˜, R′h).
Then, we have X˜\A′h 6= ∅. Moreover, there is d∗ ∈ D˜ and x∗ ∈ X˜\A′h with
µ(x∗) = (d∗, h) such that (iv) {x∗} R′h ∅. Otherwise, we would have ∅ R′h X˜
and since X˜ R′h A
′
h, Case 2 applies. Now, since x
∗ /∈ A′h, then x∗ /∈ Ah.
Hence, by (iii) and separability, (iv) Ah ∪ {x∗} Rh Ah. By (ii) and (iv), it
contradicts (i).¤
Proof of Proposition 2.8.
Assume that the hospital-optimal solution ϕH(M) is not destruction-proof.
Let M = (D,H,X,R) ∈M, h ∈ H, X ′h ⊆ Xh, and
M ′ = (D,H,X−h, X ′h, R−h, Rh|X′h). Then, we have ϕHh (M ′) Rh ϕHh (M). For
anyM ∈M, let X th(M) be the set of all contracts that h offers along the steps
of the hospitals-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm at M , up to the t-th
step. Let Ath(M) be the set of the contracts accepted at the end of the t-th
step. There exists a t such that Ath(M
′) Rh Ath(M). Since the preferences
are substitutable, we have Ath(M) = C(Rh, X
t
h(M)). Then, C(Rh, X
t
h(M
′)) Rh
C(Rh, X
t
h(M)). This yield a contradiction because X
t
h(M
′) ⊆ X th(M). ¤
Proof of Theorem 2.3.
Assume that the hospitals’ preference satisfy all properties stated in the
theorem and let ϕ be a rule which satisfies stability and strategy-proofness.
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First, we will show that the doctor-optimal solution satisfy these proper-
ties. By Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), if the firms’ preferences satisfy the
law of aggregate demand and the substitutes condition, then for the doctor-
optimal solution, it is dominant strategy for doctors to reveal truthfully their
preferences over contracts. We need to show that hospitals reveal truth-
fully their preferences over set of contracts. For any R ∈ R, let X thi(R)
be the set of all contracts that have offered to hi along the steps of the
doctors-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm at R, up to the t-th step.
Let Ati(R) be the set of the contracts at the end of the t-th step. Since
the preferences are substitutable, we have Ati(R) = C(Rhi , X
t
hi
(R)). Thus,
Ahi(R) Rhi A
t
hi
(R) or Ahi(R) = A
t
hi
(R). Suppose that hi reveals R
′
hi
in-
stead of Rhi . For some k, X
t
hi
(R) = X thi(R−hi , R
′
hi
) holds for t = 1, 2, ..., k,
and Akhi(R) = C(Rhi , X
k
hi
(R)) 6= C(R′hi , Xhi (R)) = Akhi(R−hi , R′hi). If ϕD is
not strategy-proof, then Ahi(R−hi , R
′
hi
) R′hi A
k
hi
(R−hi , R
′
hi
) R′hi A
k
hi
(R) which
yields a contradiction to the fact that the hospitals’ preferences satisfy top-
dominance condition. Second, we will show that any stable rule which is not
the doctor-optimal solution is strategy-proof. Assume that A(M) is not the
doctor-optimal solution. Then, there exists a doctor d who has not the con-
tract that he would get under the doctor-optimal solution. By Hatfield and
Milgrom (2005), the set of stable allocation is a nonempty finite lattice. Then,
ADd (M) Rd Ad(M). Now, consider the following preference relation R
′
d, for
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each {x, x′} ⊆ Xd, x Rd x′ implies x R′d x′, for each x ∈ Xd\{ADd (M)},
x Rd A
D
d (M) if and only if x R
′
d ∅, and ADd (M) R′d ∅. The doctor-optimal
solution is still stable atM ′ = (D,H,R−d, R′d, X). If the hospitals’ preferences
satisfy the law of aggregate demand and the substitutes condition, then at
every stable allocation, the same doctors are employed and every hospital fills
the same number of positions. Since ADd (M
′) 6= ∅, at another stable allocation
Ad(M
′) 6= ∅ and Ad(M ′) R′d ∅. Then, we have Ad(M ′) R′d Ad(M), which is
contradictory to strategy-proofness. ¤
